Episode 5: With the World Watching
Doug Wilson on the First Debate & Politics of National Security
Commentators describe the first presidential debate of the 2020 general election as a "hot mess inside a dumpster fire," "a bad reality TV show," and "a complete disaster." What insights on American foreign policy might we – and the rest of the world – draw in its aftermath? In this episode, host Mark Hannah is joined by Doug Wilson, the national security policy advisor for Mayor Pete Buttigieg’s erstwhile presidential campaign. Doug also served in the Obama administration as the former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.
We reflect on the first presidential debate in the context of U.S. national security policy, and on how the politics of American foreign policy is interpreted by America’s friends and foes. Doug discusses his involvement in the Buttigieg campaign, the importance of democratic legitimacy for statecraft, and the most recent survey of American public opinion on foreign policy from the Eurasia Group Foundation's Independent America project (link below).
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Doug Wilson was the national security advisor to Pete Buttigieg during the Democratic primary presidential campaign. He served in the Obama administration as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, and was the first openly-gay individual to be Senate-confirmed to a senior-level Pentagon position.
Mr. Wilson played a key role for the repeal of the “Don’t Ask/Don’t Tell” legislation. A native of Tucson, Arizona, Doug and a is a graduate of Stanford University and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
This podcast episode includes references to the Eurasia Group Foundation, now known as the Institute for Global Affairs.
Show notes:
Colin Cookman’s Pakistan-Afghanistan Update
Diplomacy & Restraint: The Worldview of American Voters (Eurasia Group Foundation, September 2020)
Archival audio:
'Dumpster fire': See Jake Tapper and Dana Bash's blunt reaction to debate (CNN, 9/29/2020)
Biden calls Trump a "CLOWN" during first presidential debate (The Hill, 9/29/2020)
Watch Top Moments From The First Presidential Debate (NBC News, 9/29/2020)
LIVE: Biden and Trump face off in the first presidential debate (Reuters, 9/29/2020)
Trump: "He's a war hero because he was captured. I like people that weren't captured" (CSPAN, 7/20/15)
Trump vehemently upset over Atlantic article that suggests he disrespected troops, John McCain (CBS This Morning, 9/4/2020)
Russia offered cash rewards to Taliban fighters to kill US troops in Afghanistan (CNN, 9/28/2020)
White House Was Aware Of Russian Bounties In 2019: Report | Morning Joe (MSNBC, 9/30/2020)
Watch Pete Buttigeig’s First Speech On Foreign Policy And National Security (NBC News, 7/12/2019)
Transcript:
October 2, 2020
DOUG WILSON: Everybody was the loser, but the biggest loser was the United States of America and the millions of people who tuned in and who are represented by this current president.
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MARK HANNAH: My name is Mark Hannah, and I'm your host for None of the Above, a podcast of the Eurasia Group Foundation. Today, I'm joined by Doug Wilson, who has a forty-year career in foreign policy, national security, politics, and communications strategy. Doug served as the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs under President Obama, among other senior positions at the Pentagon. He played a key role in the repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell. Three times he has been awarded the Department of Defense Distinguished Public Service Medal, the Pentagon's highest civilian honor, and most recently served as the senior foreign policy adviser to 2020 presidential candidate Mayor Pete Buttigieg, who is also a good friend and protégé.
We're really glad to have you with us today, Doug, and what we're going to be talking about is—you have deep experience in national security and foreign policy in the context of presidential campaigns, and right now we're in the thick of the Trump Biden contest. What we saw on Tuesday night was basically a disaster of a debate. We were preparing to ask you some questions about national security and foreign policy, probing the veracity and relevance of the candidate questions and their performance on substance. But we really didn't see a lot of substance. So I just want to ask you, Doug—let's just jump right in—what was your initial reaction to Tuesday night's debate?
WILSON: By this time, virtually every adjective in the book describing this as a total disaster has been used.
Interlude featuring archival audio
WILSON: The CNN team called it a shit show—and I realize it now used up my quota of profanity here, but it totally deserved that. Everybody was the loser, but the biggest loser was the United States of America and the millions of people who tuned in and are represented by this current president. I kept thinking about what it must be like to be a parent and have your kids watch this television program. I kept thinking if you were in Moscow or Beijing or Tehran, what joy you must be getting out of watching this disintegration of civility, intelligence, and discourse. I kept thinking, if you were in countries with which we have had strong alliances and partnerships, what a huge disappointment this was for those who hoped that ultimately the United States was going through a temporary phase. Most of all, I thought about the Wizard of Oz, and I thought what we saw was the person behind the curtain.
We call on the president because it was a legitimate election, and that's the office he holds. But he in no way, shape, or form carries himself like a leader of this country. And it was an enormous and sad occasion to see this spectacle being broadcast throughout the world as a representation of American democracy.
HANNAH: At the end of the day, did Tuesday night's debate essentially reveal that America is its own worst enemy?
WILSON: The Tuesday night debate revealed that we have a leadership which is bereft of any kind of sense of direction, civility, or understanding of what it takes to provide leadership in the world, because the issue with regard to our adversaries is not only the military threats, but the direct appeal to civil societies both in the United States and abroad about the viability of our system, the vibrancy of our democracy, the ability to connect values and interests. I am old enough to remember solidarity in Poland and what a key role United States public diplomacy officials played with regard to the spark that ultimately led to the end of communism because they were able to effectively communicate the dichotomy between the communist system and democratic values to civil society leaders and succeeded over the course of years and decades in instilling in lighting that fire. We're seeing the same thing happen to us now—as the flip side of a coin—by adversaries in Russia and China and Iran basically showing the world and conveying this lack of leadership and the lack of ability of this administration to connect the interests and values, and we are seeing that play out across the board, across the spectrum, around the world.
HANNAH: Especially now when you have English-speaking young people living in China, living in Shanghai, and in Moscow. Is there a way in which, basically, these debates that previously had to be decoded and interpreted by foreign media in the past are now getting accessed directly by these foreign publics, and without understanding America's history of messy, messy campaigns, how does this embarrassment actually translate into not just diminished prestige but diminished influence in the world?
WILSON: You're absolutely right that the advent of social media means instantaneous communication. We all have cameras on our phones. We never had cameras or phones in the era of solidarity. Anybody can watch any of this. This translates on everything from a renewed commitment to deal with racial inequality as a result of people being able to film atrocities as they take place, and it means people can watch and see what's going on not only on our streets, but within our government. I think, though, Mark, if the key to last night meant you didn't need to have a filter to watch a man whose title is president of the United States, continue to blast allies, demean individuals who hold office, demean families, convey a complete misunderstanding or lack of understanding of dealing with the worst pandemic in one hundred years, and fail to explicitly disavow white supremacists as a key element of the violence we're seeing in this country and an expression of hatred—that is a hard thing to explain away. And I think last night Joe Biden did the best he could, and it was certainly enough to continue the lead he has—a very steady lead. This next administration, as I'm sure you know, is going to have enormous boulders to push uphill because it's not going to be an automatic light switch in terms of both America's credibility abroad, people's perception of America and its interests and its values, and this is going to take a very long time.
HANNAH: I do want to get into some of the grist and substance of the debate itself, because, you know, there were moments where foreign policy and national security came up. One is when Vice President Biden really took umbrage with Donald Trump referring to soldiers and service members as suckers and losers. And he did it in a very personal way.
Interlude featuring archival audio
HANNAH: To what extent do you think—I think the president thinks he might have service members on his side. Given your experience in the Pentagon, where do you think service members exist on the political spectrum? What are the assets and liabilities each campaign brings to trying to earn their votes?
WILSON: I think it is a mistake to categorize all veterans, just like it would be to categorize any particular group as being monolithic. Certainly my three times at the Pentagon and my interaction with men and women in uniform at all levels, from the most senior levels to enlisted up all the way, did not demonstrate to me that there is a lock step in being involved with any one particular party, particularly some of the newer and younger people who represent a more diverse workforce, not only in the military, but elsewhere. I will say this. As I'm sure you know, the Military Times recently did a poll showing, I think for the first time ever, that troops support Biden over Trump by five or six points. Here's what that means. It means they don't like being used as political props. They don't like being sent on missions like that in Lafayette Square, which go against their values and what it is they're told to do. They don't like hearing that a president of the United States refuses to call on the carpet the leader of Russia, when it is alleged with some considerable proof, that Russia was responsible for down payments to Taliban contracts or individuals to kill American troops. They certainly do not identify with—and hugely reject—throwing allies under the bus on the battlefield, as the president did with the Kurds when he removed the presence in Turkey. These are people who served on our battlefield, on the battlefield against ISIS, together with us, and suffered great losses. And to have thrown them under the bus really made an impression. But I think calling troops suckers and losers, is something I am—if you take a look at social media now, you are seeing veterans from the Korean War, from World War two, older veterans, younger men, and women universally going on in disbelief as well as anger. The anger we saw Joe Biden demonstrate last night is shared by many, many in uniform who have had sons and daughters serving on the battlefield. And it is one of the reasons the recent letter that came out from national security leaders supporting Biden contained names of retired military that you never would have seen before on any such letter, including Paul Silva, a former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Trump.
HANNAH: Do you still keep in touch with a lot of the people you work in the Pentagon with, people who might still be there in a career capacity? And I was taken by what Vice President Biden said on Tuesday in the debate, and he basically said that when President Trump walked across Lafayette Park and tear gassed the protesters to get his photo op, the top general, was disappointed in that decision. I wonder if there's other rumbling coming out of the Pentagon or people who are still in touch with that are similarly displeased by the performance of the president when it comes to that?
WILSON: Displeased would be a true understatement.
HANNAH: Well, give me give me a more exact—
WILSON: It’s a nice way of putting it. I've already used by one percent. I’ve cashed that in already.
HANNAH: We're not censored by the FCC here. Go nuts.
WILSON: Friends of mine who serve at the Pentagon and friends who are both in political capacity and in military capacity are hugely demoralized. They're afraid, and they're worried in particular about the competence of the current occupant of the White House to make decisions that are not going to get them and this country into military situations from which there's no easy way out or escape. I think that view is pervasive. And I think that doesn't have to do with whether they're Republican or Democrat. These are patriots. These are men and women who have seen on the battlefield what you and I have probably never seen and never will. But these are also people who come from our communities, from all over the country, and they're watching this and seeing this. And there's great concern at all levels. So, yes, I do keep in touch. I have always tipped my hat to all of them who have served their country, and especially now, because they're serving in positions in which many of them wish they didn't have to be. But they're doing so because their love of country and their concern for country outweighs a very considerable concern about this administration.
HANNAH: We heard in Tuesday's debate the president failed to disavow white supremacist groups, and sort of made veiled suggestions that his supporters should monitor polling places in a way that could be construed as illegal. How worried are you about the prospect for either paramilitary or militia group violence around the election? Or if the president is still polling ten points below Vice President Biden nationally two weeks before the election, in a couple of days, that there could be a kind of “wag the dog” situation, that there could be a military skirmish the president engages in in order to try to rally around his reelection?
WILSON: Well, I think there's two or three different points here. Let me tell you what I am not worried about. I am not worried that military leaders are going to follow orders to which they feel that the difference between doing this and their oath to the Constitution requires them not to do that. What I do think is realistic is the hypothetical that the military might be called upon to play some role with regards order in the streets, orders I don't believe military leaders will follow. I also don't believe the military will be part of removing a president from office. I also believe the institutions that are involved with a peaceful transfer of power—Congress, however broken it is, the courts—will play their roles, as disgusted as I am with members of the president's party in Congress refusing to play any kind of role in fueling him or disowning him. The one thing that has heartened me somewhat is to have heard the comments from everybody across the board that there will be a peaceful transition of power and that a new president will take office on January 20.
That having been said, I also think there are people who are riled up enough in this country, and that riling up—in part due to the president's dog whistles, as we saw last night—can do damage in the short term and cause fear. I think that will be addressed. My fear is the messiness post-election that’s possible, not just with regards to ballot counting, but to protests in the street.
HANNAH: It is now time for a round of extraneous and miscellaneous questions for which we expect spontaneous and quick answers. Doug Wilson, what is the one book about America and the world that you would require both presidential candidates to read in the few weeks they have left to the campaign?
WILSON: Probably David McCullough's Truman.
HANNAH: OK, the worst American foreign policy blunder of the past century?
WILSON: The election of 2016. It led to four years of dismantling some of the most important precepts of American foreign policy.
HANNAH: One piece of professional advice you wish you had received as a kid?
WILSON: The most important thing to consider when you're doing a job or taking a job is who you're going to be working with.
HANNAH: A role model for the work you do today?
WILSON: Probably my mentor in the Foreign Service, my first boss, Lois Roth, now deceased, who is a public diplomacy official, or her most recent post before I came in was Iran. She was somebody who taught me to be inclusive and look to the next generation. I was the next generation then, and she was a mentor and a model.
HANNAH: How do you take that to heart when it comes to working with the next generation today?
WILSON: It frames how I work. It's framed how I've worked for thirty-five years, looking to find really talented men and women who are in it for the right reasons. I'm much less interested in those who are using a job to just add to the resume—making sure they’ve got the right resume—as opposed to people who really want to do something and make a difference in what they're doing. And if I'm proud of anything in my career, it's that I've specialized in that.
HANNAH: What is one publication you read every day?
WILSON: Well, it's easy to say the Washington Post, but I'm going to say something else. There's a publication called The Pakistan Afghanistan Daily Update. It's written by a young man named Colin Cookman. He started this as a project at the Center for American Progress, and he got so into it that he ended up doing this on his own.
It is a daily update making sense of a region you have a hard time making sense of—short, quick summaries of what's going on in the region. And it's how I’ve followed the Afghan peace process, the constant chaos in Pakistan, and American policy there. And he's done the kind of thing the next generation leaders I've been involved with should be doing, which is to take an initiative and turn it into something hugely useful for a lot of people.
HANNAH: Doug, am I right that you essentially discovered Mayor Pete?
WILSON: Well, I don't know about discovered, but I was his first boss. I picked him out of a sheaf of resumes I was given when I was running the Clinton or the John Kerry Edwards campaign in my home state of Arizona, and I called him up and asked him if he'd be my research director. Two days later, he was on my doorstep.
HANNAH: Let's spend a minute on Mayor Pete's background, because he is a rising political talent, in part because of his strong foreign policy background and progressive views on use of force issues. You advised him on all things national security. And one of the things I thought was interesting about a speech he gave last summer—which I think was at Indiana University—he emphasized the importance of a more judicious and restrained approach to the use of military force while also remaining actively engaged in the world through diplomacy and rejoining agreements like the Paris Climate Agreement and the Iran nuclear deal. And that essentially mirrors what the majority of Americans want according to our own surveys and our recent study at the Eurasia Group Foundation. Given the popularity of this approach—more military restraint and active diplomacy—why don't more politicians adopt it?
WILSON: I actually think more politicians are adopting it, even since the Vietnam War. I'd even go back that far. And going forward, with the possible exception of Operation Desert Storm under George H.W. Bush, people understand—and understand increasingly—that committing large numbers of land troops in places which are difficult, if not impossible, to bring under control under your way of life has increasingly reduced domestic public support. That having been said, the use of military tools versus diplomatic tools is not a zero choice. Pete, I think, wanted to make very clear—based in part on his experience in Afghanistan, but also, as a pragmatist—that we don't have to say we're either always or never going to commit troops to a particular place.
Interlude featuring archival audio
WILSON: He is somebody who definitely called for increasing use of diplomacy, and I have to say, Mark, I think that's almost become a trope. We have to use more diplomacy. We have to do better diplomacy. But I think Pete's approach on places like Afghanistan, Syria, and Yemen are that we can't and shouldn't think of this as committing large troops in endless wars. We can and should think of this as where the United States, together with allies, can make a difference by having a small number of counterterrorist operatives, CIA operatives, and intelligence operatives to make sure the basic rule of national security is met, which is essentially the security of the citizens of the United States and its partners, and that can be done with fewer resources.
HANNAH: And haven't we lost sight of that to some extent? When did we go from wanting to protect Americans from physical harm or economic harm to thinking entire governments needed to be overthrown in order to do that? I think there is a way in which we might both inflate the threat of otherwise odious governments and deflate, obviously, the costs.
WILSON: I think the roots are in Vietnam. But I also think as a result of all of our victories in World War Two and the fact that we became not only the predominant superpower, but almost the only superpower, despite the rivalry with the then Soviet Union, a feeling that nothing was impossible started to grow, and it combined with, “We've got to take care of this problem, and we can take care of this problem if we throw enough money and muscle at it.” At the same time that started to grow, we also started to see longer wars, less successful efforts, a lack of understanding of the environments in which we were competing, and a disillusionment on behalf of the American public about why we were where. I think it's really important, Mark, to differentiate why we were where we were, from a feeling of “we should never go anywhere.” I'll give you an example. I think Rwanda was an example of where then-President Clinton thought we could have acted in concert with our allies more strategically, more effectively, and made more of a difference than we did. And in the speech you referred to—the Indiana speech he gave—he made clear that humanitarian reasons could be a valid reason for using military force in combination with all others as a last resort, as long as certain criteria were met. One of the things I think he tried to make clear was that in Libya, when we went after Gadhafi and ended not only his regime and him, we had not given much, if any, thought to what comes the next day. What are the consequences? What are the unintended consequences which you have to think about not only the day after, but many, many days and weeks before, and plan for those? There are many criteria, I think, that frame the use of force. Never using it is probably not a good idea, just like always using it is not a good idea.
HANNAH: I think that's wonderful because, again, we do these surveys—and I know there was a generation of foreign policy makers that really began with Kissinger who sort of disdained American public opinion to some extent. They weren't small “d” democrats, and they thought the whims of the American people or popularity of certain policies could cloud judgment—expert judgment. And I do think that—again, part of the reason we do these surveys is because we see the need to in a democracy that's predicated on the consent of the governed—more engagement with public opinion. And I also think the American people are relatively enlightened on certain issues. Our survey found roughly more than seventy percent support rejoining the Paris Climate Agreement. And so last night when President Trump said flatly that the American people don't support it, we threw up a quick fact check there because that goes against the data we have and have seen—same with the JCPOA. I think it registers around sixty-seven percent support rejoining the World Health Organization. So there is an enthusiasm for more diplomatic engagement. Although to your point, you mentioned people can sometimes see diplomats—increased diplomacy—as a panacea or just a sort of calling card rather than having a concrete plan to achieve it.
WILSON: I think that's right. And it even extends to things like Trump's killing of Soleimani earlier this year. People are angry at Iran, but they're also—could leave the door open to exactly the kind of ground troop, endless war scenario they so severely reject. This president shoots from the hip. His decisions often do not involve his own stakeholders in his government, those responsible for diplomatic and military tools in his government. So I think if you go back, you'll find there was great concern. And this celebration of the assassination of a man who certainly had been a threat to the United States was not welcomed with open arms. It was a mixed reaction with the concern about what this would lead to, with people who have family deployed in battlefields for years and years leading the concern.
HANNAH: Yeah. And I want to get into the use of force and the AUMF. Candidate Pete Buttigieg took a strong stance on repealing and replacing the authorization for the use of military force from 2001, based in part on his own experiences in Afghanistan. And as many of our listeners know, that has now been used to justify interventions for nearly twenty years, including in the Sahel and in northern Africa and places that had nothing to do with 9/11. You have experience working with this from your time in the Pentagon under Barack Obama. Can you explain quickly to those listening what the AUMF is and then how your experience at DOD affect your views for what we do in the next four years of a Trump administration or the first four years of a Biden administration and addressing the kind of outdated authorization of—?
WILSON: AUMF means the authorization for the use of military force, which was initially authorized immediately after our post-9/11 involvement in Afghanistan, and Congress gave authorization for use of troops in Afghanistan. That has then served as a basis to authorize troops in, what is it, over a dozen countries around the world? What Pete was saying was Congress has a role. The administration has a duty to consult with Congress, and Congress has the duty to step up to the plate. And just like there should be no endless wars, there should be no open ended, endless authorizations to fund them. And what should be required are sunset provisions where administrations are required to renew authorization every three years if a conflict lasts that long, and that specific parameters be placed on the authorization and funding of use of force.
HANNAH: And that gets into the replace part of repeal and replace. A lot of people in my orbit are not even fans of replacing it. They think it should just be scrapped. Right? The impetus, the reason for being of the AUMF is no longer there, and therefore it should be that the president should seek approval from Congress to use military force overseas.
WILSON: I think that's right.
HANNAH: And you would go so far to say to you agree with that?
WILSON: Again, we make a mistake if we look at this in zero sum terms and say, “There never should be these, or we always should use them.” It should be required by circumstances, and understanding that the American people need to be invested in the decision, or we're going to have no success in implementing it. Congress is the place to do it. So I guess Pete's call was twofold. We look at the AUMF, making sure there are sunset provisions but saying to members of Congress, you've been elected, and this is part of your duty. Speaking personally—not on behalf of Pete, just speaking personally—taking a look at who's being elected to Congress over the past several years, I'll make an exception. In 2018 we had a number of men and women who served in uniform who are now serving in Congress who understand this. But too many are going to Congress based on stepping stones to careers and not thinking enough about why it is they've been elected and what their responsibilities are.
HANNAH: Doug, I want to thank you so much for joining us today.
I am Mark Hannah, and this has been another episode of None of the Above, a podcast of the Eurasia Group Foundation. I want to give special thanks today to our None of the Above team which make this all possible. Thanks to our producer Caroline Gray, our editor Luke Taylor, sound engineer Zubin Hensler, and EGF’s graduate research assistant Adam Pontius.
If you enjoyed what you heard today, we'd appreciate you subscribing on Google Play, iTunes, Spotify, or anywhere else you find podcasts. Rate and review us, and if there is a topic you want us to cover or a guest you want us to invite, shoot us an email at info@egfound.org. Doug, thanks for joining. Stay safe out there, and see you next time.
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