Glenn Greenwald on How Bipartisanship Prolongs the Forever Wars

This podcast episode includes references to the Eurasia Group Foundation, now known as the Institute for Global Affairs.

Show notes:

How the House Armed Services Committee, in the Middle of a Pandemic, Approved a Huge Military Budget and More War in Afghanistan (The Intercept, 7/9/20)
How Congress Maintains Endless War - System Update with Glenn Greenwald (video) (The Intercept, 7/9/20)

Archival audio:

Boozman Delivers Speech in Support of Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (Senator John Boozman, 7/20/20)
Rep. Khanna voting NO on the final Defense Bill (Rep. Ro Khanna, 12/11/19)
Foreign Policy - Quincy Institute Forum Rep. Ro Khanna (CA-17) and Will Ruger (FP Events, 2/27/20)
Gaetz explains why he voted with Dems on War Powers resolution (Fox News, 1/9/20)
Menendez on Venezuela in Maduro's Grasp (Senator Bob Menendez, 8/4/20)
Murphy Questions Department of State Officials on Humanitarian Situation in Venezuela (Senator Chris Murphy, 8/4/20)

Transcript:

September 15, 2020

GLENN GREENWALD: Simply that the policies both parties endorse—a posture of endless war, of militarism, of aggression, of blind support for Israel—not only are amoral but are actually contrary to the interest of the American people.

***

MARK HANNAH: My name is Mark Hannah, and I'm your host for None of the Above, a podcast from the Eurasia Group Foundation. Today, we are joined by Glenn Greenwald. Glenn is a co-founder of The Intercept, a journalist, a constitutional lawyer, and the author of four New York Times bestselling books. He has won numerous awards for his reporting on mass surveillance and human rights abuses against the backdrop of the global war on terror.

Glenn, very glad to have you with us.

GREENWALD: Hey, it's great to be with you. Thank you for the invitation.

HANNAH: Let's talk for a minute about bipartisanship in foreign policy. Do you think bipartisanship is necessarily a bad thing in that context?

GREENWALD: I don't think it's inherently a bad thing. I think, first of all, there is a tendency in mainstream political and media circles to claim bipartisanship is extremely rare, that it virtually never happens, that the two parties are so at each other's throat they virtually agree on nothing, when the reality in the foreign policy realm at the very least, is almost entirely the opposite. They find far more common ground than they do differences. I think it's important to point out how much bipartisanship there actually is. And then to the extent my critique applies to that, it's not that there should be an avoidance of bipartisanship for its own sake, but simply that the policies both parties endorse—a posture of endless war, of militarism, of aggression, of blind support for Israel—not only are amoral but are actually contrary to the interest of the American people, which may not be the same thing as the interest of the U.S. government.

HANNAH: And how are they immoral? I mean, one could argue that they're politically expedient, that they are trying to, you know, cave to political pressures of the military industrial complex and others. But do you think the people who are elected actually don't believe the things they are saying? Do you think it's disingenuous, that it’s amoral in that sense?

GREENWALD: Well, I think they may not conceive of it in those terms. Nobody likes to think of themselves as being proponents of amorality. There's a heavy propagandistic framework of American exceptionalism with which we've all been inculcated that tells us America has the right to do things other countries don't. You know, in terms of the evidence of amorality, you could point to the two most significant foreign policy events of this generation and the prior one, which is the war in Vietnam and the war in Iraq, both of which are regarded around the world by a vast majority of people as being unjust wars that slaughtered huge numbers of innocent civilians in those countries for no justifiable reason. Neither Vietnam nor Iraq were threats to the self-defense of the United States, nor were they attacking the United States. And nor were they on the verge of doing so. And I think in general, if you look at who U.S. allies are—obviously Western European democracies, but also some of the most barbaric and savage regimes on the planet, whether it be Saudi Arabia or Egypt or throughout Latin America—it's often been the case that U.S. foreign policy asserts the right to topple democratically elected governments they view as unfavorable to it and replace them with despots and tyrants they view as more favorable, which I also regard as amoral. But that is still a staple of U.S. foreign policy.

HANNAH: There seems to be a reckoning right now after the Iraq war. It's not just regarded around the world as a failure, but now that is also increasingly the bipartisan consensus within the United States. And I think you're now starting to see different think tanks emerge advocating for anti-interventionism. You're starting to see neocons rehabilitating themselves and reforming. Joe Biden is putting out a platform based on humility, saying it's more about the power of our example rather than the example of our power. Of course, he has a long legacy as a sort of internationalist and supporting various interventions. Do you have any hope that an alternative to this sort of impulsive interventionism will emerge?

GREENWALD: I don’t think so. I think one of the reasons, for example, you’ve seen this migration of neoconservatives and even kind of hawkish, more independent think tank types to the Democratic Party is because of a recognition that the Democrats are actually not just more capable, but even more willing to pursue this expansionist, or at least interventionist, foreign policy. You say—and I think there's some validity to it—that there was kind of an awakening after Iraq. I think the view of Iraq was not that it was amoral or that it violated principles of how a sovereign nation should behave, but that it was poorly executed. I think the concerns are more strategic than they are on principle. And during the Obama Administration you saw another regime change operation in Libya, as well as an attempted one in Syria, which wasn't fully unleashed by Obama. He put some constraints on it, but there was a billion dollars a year spent on a CIA covert operation to dislodge Assad from power. Those were similar, at least in terms of the reasons we probably ought not to be doing that, and those were led by Democrats. You look at who the most dedicated advocates of regime change war are, and you really do find them in the Democratic Party. Susan Rice, Samantha Power, Ben Rhodes—all of those kinds of people who are going to be back in power if Joe Biden wins. So I don't view a Biden administration with a lot of optimism when it comes to pulling back on U.S. imperialism or hegemony or aggression.

HANNAH: And why, do you think? We've done polling at the Eurasia Group Foundation that shows voters wanting a much less expensive and ambitious and muscular foreign policy than is currently advocated in D.C. But why do you think there is such a disconnect between foreign policy leaders or the establishment—or you've called them the deep state as well—and ordinary American voters? Is there little incentive to heed public opinion on this particular topic?

GREENWALD: Well, I don't think you see the disparity you're accurately describing confined to the foreign policy realm. If you look at polling data on a whole range of issues, whether it be Medicare for all or universal health care coverage or increasing the minimum wage, all those kinds of issues have found a lot of voice on the left wing populist side of the Democratic Party, but also on the right wing populist side of the Republican Party.

You see polls often overwhelmingly show majoritarian support for policies that have very little chance of being enacted in Congress. And to that list, I would add the one you raised, which is the idea of a less muscular, less aggressive, less interventionist policy. And I think the reason for it is that the people who fund the Congress and who exert the most influence in the executive branch are not the people who are forming majoritarian sentiment, but are the ones exercising the greatest financial and political power. And there's often a huge divergence in the interest between that powerful minority and the less powerful majority that I think explains that discrepancy.

HANNAH: Which of the two presidential candidates do you think might be swayed by an increasingly anti-war public: a Biden presidency, or a second term of Donald Trump?

GREENWALD: I mean, the reason it's hard to say is because Trump is so erratic. He has no real fixed beliefs. He's very impulsive. He reacts to things based on his petty, trivial personal slights of the moment. Clearly, in 2016, Trump ran to what you might call the left or the isolationist right of Hillary Clinton. The reason the intelligence community hates Trump, and hated Trump from the beginning, was because he was opposed to things like the regime change operation in Syria, and he was saying there's no reason we should support anti-Russian elements in Ukraine and risk conflict with Ukraine—ironically, things President Obama himself believed in a lot more than people recognized. Whereas, you know, I think it's just very hard to say. I think Biden is going to bring with him into the White House a lot of those regime change enthusiasts that populated the Obama administration, and they'll probably have promotions and be more empowered. But I think it's probably true that on the spectrum of Democratic foreign policy-making, Biden tends to—notwithstanding his support for the Iraq war and his history in the Senate—over the last decade be sort of a voice for greater restraints within the Obama administration. But how much of a real president Biden is going to be is also something I don't think we know. So I think it's a very difficult question to answer, given the differing oddities of both candidates.

HANNAH: We've been talking about bipartisanship on national security and foreign policy. One example of that in action is the National Defense Authorization Act of 2021. This is a 740 billion dollar defense budget recently passed in committee in the House of Representatives, unanimously by both the Republicans and the Democrats.

Interlude featuring archival audio

GREENWALD: I think it's two things. One is it's just an enormous waste of money. Why should the United States have a military that's massively larger than any other country in the world, including countries with much greater populations such as India and China? If you look at the pure numbers—understand they can be misleading when you look at pure dollar amounts, but still—they don't tell the whole story, but they tell a big part of it. The U.S. spends three times more than any other country. The next leading country, which is China, spends more than the next fifteen countries combined. The country that's often talked about as the great geopolitical threat of the United States is Russia, and it spends one tenth of what the United States spends on its military. And even if you adjust for the relative weight of the dollar and the like, or the cost of things in the United States, the U.S. military is vastly larger than any other military in the world. So, I think in one sense, it's just a waste of resources. Think about all that can be done with that money when there's a disappearing middle class, and people are burdened for life by college debt when they can't afford health care for their children, when public schools and infrastructure are crumbling.

So that's one part. It’s just wasteful. But the other part is I think it defines the United States as a militaristic power. You know, there's that famous anecdote when Madeleine Albright wanted to intervene in the Balkans, and Colin Powell was opposed, she essentially said, “Why do we spend all this money on this military if we're not going to use it?” And he was horrified. But I think there's an instinctive validity to that view. Look, one of the things we decided to be in the world is the military hegemon, which I think makes it more likely that we're going to use the weaponry we've invested in. It’s sort of like, if you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail. And I think it really infects and contaminates the U.S. national identity in the role we play in the world.

HANNAH: There is this odd coupling of anti-war progressives and more anti-interventionist small government conservatives, but it sounds like you're saying they are no match for the establishment war machine. So, are you saying you're hopeless?

GREENWALD: No, no, no, I'm not. You're definitely right that I think as of now, there's a mismatch in power for sure, and the kind of establishment wings of both parties that believe in that traditional foreign policy posture reign supreme. But you know, I produced a program about a month ago on the House Armed Services Committee hearing that approved the budget you described. While you were right that the ultimate budget was approved unanimously, the real action took place when it came to the amendments, things like amendments to bar the Trump administration from following through on its plan to withdraw troops from Afghanistan or to withdraw troops from Germany—not all troops, but some troops—on the grounds that the reason for them, the Soviet Union, no longer exists, as well as proposed limitations on the Trump administration's war powers like requiring more explanations for withdrawing from arms control treaties with Russia or limiting what they can do with the Saudis and Yemen. And what was fascinating was the coalition that formed to block those amendments that sought to limit U.S. troop presence in the world was essentially the hawkish members of the Democratic Party dominating that committee, joined with the faction led by Liz Cheney, who has a very similar political philosophy to her father. And the opponents were very similar in their argumentation—the anti-war left, people like O'Connor and Tulsi Gabbard, and then probably the most articulate exponent of the anti-interventionist view was Matt Gates, who was a MAGA, Pro-Trump, “make America great again,” America first isolationist. But the arguments really converged in this really interesting way.

Interlude featuring archival audio

GREENWALD: I do think that if you look at the Republican Party, you saw this even before Trump with the success of Ron Paul being able to go into Iowa and South Carolina—hard red places—and inveigh against the war in Iraq and against postures of endless war and even talk about drug legalization, questioning the foundational premises of the Republican Party that have led to this bipartisan consensus. And you obviously see the emergence of a left wing populist wing of the Democratic Party that's also opposed to this. So I do very much see this potential realignment as a cause for optimism, probably the greatest cause for optimism if you were to look for one.

HANNAH: Do you see this alliance formalizing in any way? Is it potentially a caucus or a voting bloc? Where do you see this going?

GREENWALD: I mean, we've seen it kind of forming for a while. I remember when Ron Paul was running for president and was asked who an ideal running mate would be. He said Dennis Kucinich, and they often work together not just on anti-corporatist measures like auditing the fed, but also on restricting war powers and foreign policy. I remember when I started writing about politics in 2005 and 2006 with the focus on objecting to the executive power abuses of Bush and Cheney and the war in Iraq and the war on terror excesses. As I saw them, I found alliances with places like the Cato Institute and right wing members of the Republican Party, including Ron Paul. So I think this alliance has been lurking for a while. I think one of the problems is that there are a lot of other issues, cultural issues in particular, that are used to keep us divided. And I think it's interesting there's more of a willingness on the right to overtly work in alliance with people on the left when it comes to opposing monopoly power of tech giants or restricting endless war as the posture of the U.S. foreign policy. Whereas on the left, it's still quite demonized to say, “I'm going to work in alliance with far right members of Congress, even though they can help form a majority.”

HANNAH: Do you think that part of that is because—maybe this is an oversimplification—the left is more values-driven, and the right is more interest-driven?

GREENWALD: I think that's part of it. I think a bigger part, though, is the left has not really matured into a political movement that cares enough about power, about actually winning, about implementing an agenda which often requires unpleasant or impure alliances. And I think it's a very—the way I look at politics is similar to the way I look at journalism. To me, it's very different from art or poetry or music. There's no such thing as good journalism that doesn't make an impact, and there's no such thing as good politics that don’t change society for the better. So if you're somebody who just believes politics is about embracing this perfect set of political philosophies and values that are noble and benevolent or whatever and don't care very much about whether or not you actually implement them, that to me is just very self-indulgent. It's kind of a vacant politics. So, yeah, I think I do probably care more than the standard leftist about finding ways to implement policy visions and change the government and society for the better, as I see it. And I hope the left will start to think more seriously and more deeply about that question.

HANNAH: And now it's time for our lightning round, where we ask extraneous and miscellaneous questions for which we expect spontaneous answers from our guest here. Glenn, what is the one book about America and the world that you would require both presidential candidates to read?

GREENWALD: I would say—I'll give you two. They're similar. I would say either Noam Chomsky’s book 9/11, which is written in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, or his prior book with Edward Herman called Manufacturing Concerned about how propaganda functions in our political culture.

HANNAH: A classic of media studies departments. OK, the worst American foreign policy blunder of the past one hundred years?

GREENWALD: I have a little problem with the word blunder because it implies kind of a well-intentioned mistake. I would say Iraq would probably be the worst blunder, but I would say the most immoral foreign policy action was the war in Vietnam.

HANNAH: OK, one piece of professional advice you wish you'd received as a child?

GREENWALD: Don't feel compelled to follow a path that has been laid out by other people, but be willing and imaginative and courageous enough to forge your own.

HANNAH: I like it. I like it. A role model for the work you do on a daily basis?

GREENWALD: I would say Daniel Ellsberg, who was a childhood hero of mine and who I think taught everybody that summoning the courage to sacrifice your own self-interest, even if it means going to prison for life in pursuit of a cause you believe is just, is a really noble thing to do.

HANNAH: Quick historical footnote for those who don't remember: Daniel Ellsberg was the government contractor who leaked the Pentagon Papers. And Glenn, you might find this interesting. My grandfather was actually the federal magistrate who set Ellsberg’s arraignment. I was able to meet Dan Ellsberg a few years ago, and he remembered everything about that interaction, that experience, and how my grandfather didn't want him to come into the court in handcuffs because he'd become sort of a martyr. But Daniel insisted on being treated like anybody else, and there was a little bit of political stagecraft involved.

GREENWALD: Yeah, it's scary. I think he's in his late 80s, early 90s, and his memory is better than anyone I know who's in their 20s or 30s. It's kind of alarming.

HANNAH: A publication you read every day?

GREENWALD: I actually read the New York Times every day.

HANNAH: Wow. I'm surprised by that answer.

GREENWALD: I don't necessarily love the New York Times every day, but I do read the New York Times every day.

HANNAH: Let's talk for a minute about Russia. You've been critical of the Democrats for what you call their obsession with Russian election interference. Do you give any credence to the suggestion that foreign governments, including Russia, are in fact trying to influence our election in ways that are unprecedented given the technologies available to them?

GREENWALD: Of course. I mean, I think all great powers try to interfere in the domestic politics of other great powers in order to produce outcomes they perceive to be in their interests, and Russia is certainly a country which does that, as the United States and China and Iran and pretty much every other country that packs any kind of a punch.

HANNAH: Yeah, and do the Democrats have a right to be upset about this? I mean, I have a sense that the Biden campaign isn't going to spend a lot of time focusing on Russian meddling because it might come across as sour grapes or poor sportsmanship. But do you get the sense that Democrats should be justifiably indignant about this?

GREENWALD: No, I do not. For one thing, I think you're right about the politics. I think the political class has been obsessed with Russia, but the average American wakes up, on their list of things to worry about, Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin simply don't even appear on that list, let alone near the top. When the Democrats won the midterm election in 2018, almost none of their candidates even mentioned Russia, let alone centered it as one of them. They talked about health care and college debt and the things Americans actually care about. And I think the Democrats are going to be smart enough this year to recognize those political priorities.

But the reason I don't think they have a right to be indignant about it is because they support interference far more severe than some Facebook ads and Twitter bots and even hacking. I mean, Democrats routinely, like Republicans, favor the toppling of democratically elected leaders. Just last year, the United States cheered the military coup that removed the democratically elected president of Bolivia and replaced him with an interim government, quote unquote, that's still in power and which never could have won an election on its own. So, the idea of being indignant if you're a Democrat about that kind of interference by Russia when you yourself support interference far more severe is like Charles Manson being indignant that somebody stepped on his toe. I think if you want to have credibility to object to that, you have to stop supporting those kind of policies for other countries as well. Otherwise, no one is going to take that seriously.

HANNAH: You're in South America now. What's going on with Venezuela? Do you have any thoughts about the Trump Administration's policies toward Maduro and whether they would change substantially under a Biden administration?

GREENWALD: Well, the policy of the U.S. toward Venezuela is bipartisan. It's also kind of bizarre. They recognize Juan Guiteau as the official president, a person who has never received a single vote to be the president of Venezuela, which is, on its face, kind of an odd thing to do. And when President Trump invited Mr. Biden to the State of the Union address and declared he was the legitimate president of a sovereign Venezuela, the first person on her feet cheering was Nancy Pelosi. And I think if anything, just two weeks ago, one of the most important Democratic senators when it comes to foreign policy, Chris Murphy of Connecticut, posted a Twitter thread criticizing Trump for failing to carry out the coup, as he called it, of Maduro effectively and with efficiency and competence. He wasn't opposed to the coup attempt. He was angry it wasn't done successfully, that Maduro is still in power.

Interlude featuring archival audio

GREENWALD: I don't really think it would be a priority of the Bush administration to remove Maduro from power, but I think it's something they would probably be more focused on than Trump is because it is consistent with the Democratic outlook on the world as opposed to Trump, who is fine with dictatorial regimes as long as they're not really bothering him.

HANNAH: You are a strong and vocal critic of the American government we have right now. And I'm just curious whether you consider yourself a patriot, whether you're a patriotic American. How do you style yourself? How do you think of yourself in this context?

GREENWALD: Yeah, I mean, it's obviously a weighted word. That word means different things to different people. It's been used as a term of political propaganda. But if I use my own definition, which is a citizen of a country that's concerned with the well-being of the citizens of that country and wants to do things to make the country a better and more just place to be, I definitely identify as an American citizen. I care about what happens to the United States, and I believe my work is intended to improve the well-being of the United States and its citizens. And to me, that's patriotism.

HANNAH: Well, Glenn Greenwald, I want to thank you so much for joining us.

GREENWALD: Yeah, it was a great discussion. I really enjoyed it. Thank you for having me.

HANNAH: You can follow Glenn's work over at theintercept.com and on Twitter @ggreenwald, and make sure to check out System Update, a new weekly show of The Intercept that Glenn hosts.

I’m Mark Hannah, and this has been another episode of None of the Above, a podcast of the Eurasia Group Foundation. I want to give a special shout out to our None of the Above team who make this all possible. Thank you to our producer, Caroline Gray, our editor Luke Taylor, sound engineer Zubin Hensler, and EGF’s summer intern Keenan Ashbrook.

If you enjoy what you heard, we would appreciate you subscribing on Google Play, iTunes, Spotify, or anywhere else you find podcasts. Rate and review us, and if there's a topic you want us to cover, shoot us an email at info@egfound.org. Thanks for joining us. Stay safe out there. See you next time.

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