Rose Gottemoeller on the Potential
for Nuclear War

This podcast episode includes references to the Eurasia Group Foundation, now known as the Institute for Global Affairs.

Archival

“Putin issues ominous nuclear threat after losses in Ukraine,” (CNN, September 21, 2022)
“Biden says Putin's threat puts nuclear risk at highest level since Cuban missile crisis,” (CBS News, October 7, 2022)
“Weekly Address: New START Treaty "Fundamental" to Security,” (The Obama White House, November 19, 2010)
“On New START Treaty Extension,” (US Department of State)
“Notebook: New START Treaty,” (CBS News, December 2, 2010)

Transcript:

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Nuclear weapons are important, but they are a dead-end by comparison with some of the newer technologies that are coming out. So, we shouldn't be gripped over much by requirements for them going forward. We need to be judicious. We need to understand what our nuclear requirements are, but we also need to think about what else we need to defend ourselves in 2050 and beyond.

MARK HANNAH: Welcome to None of the Above, a podcast of the Eurasia Group Foundation. My name is Mark Hannah. Today we're asking, among other things: How likely is it that Russia uses a nuclear weapon against Ukraine?

I get it. This might not be the most welcoming question after a long holiday weekend, but it's one that's likely crossed your mind at some point since the war in Ukraine began. It certainly crossed ours.

Interlude featuring archival audio

HANNAH: So, to help us understand the potential for the use of nuclear weapons by Russia or the United States and the ways in which tensions could be subdued, we spoke to perhaps the best person out there on this topic, Rose Gottemoeller.

GOTTEMOELLER: I think President Biden has been very straightforward. He's known for his plain speaking and definitely his public remarks about the potential for nuclear Armageddon. I think this really caused a lot of people to sit up and take notice, and it caused the Kremlin to sit up and take notice they were playing and are playing with fire.

HANNAH: Rose has served as the deputy secretary general of NATO and the undersecretary for arms control and international security at the United States State Department. But perhaps most important to this conversation was her role as America's chief negotiator of New START. That's the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. And we're going to dive into that more in a minute.

GOTTEMOELLER: So, I think Biden's plain speaking has been helpful in this case. But also the actions of the entire US government have been very well calibrated, I think, to convey the message that the United States is not seeking to escalate the situation and, in fact, wants to ensure we bring the nuclear temperature down. So, for example, the United States has been very careful about testing its intercontinental ballistic missiles during this period, about nuclear exercises and training, and has done everything to convey at every turn that we are not in any way pushing to move in a nuclear direction. And in fact, we believe we need to move in the opposite direction. Any kind of nuclear use would be unwarranted at this present time.

HANNAH: The question I have is: In order to avoid escalation, in order to ratchet down these tensions, do you think the Biden administration should be engaging in diplomacy with Moscow, however quietly, without Zelenskyy or the Ukrainian government's active involvement?

GOTTEMOELLER: The administration is seeking to avoid not nuclear escalation out of this crisis, but nuclear use. The Biden administration has been quite clear they are resolved that this war between Russia and Ukraine not turn into a wider war in Europe against the NATO alliance and potentially a global war—World War III—with the risk of nuclear escalation running much higher than they are at the current moment. I think it's a confusing and difficult balancing act. But nevertheless, I think NATO has been rather skilled at ensuring this balancing act has gone forward in a way which is responsible. NATO and the United States want to avoid a wider war, and that's the top line objective. Where Russia is concerned, they've got, of course, their own objectives. But Ukraine and Russia are in this fight together. And I think we are doing the right thing in NATO to continue to support Ukraine in every way we can.

HANNAH: After the Soviet Union broke up, there were a lot of nuclear weapons in what is now Ukraine. And they were sent back to Moscow. I think that was a product to some extent of the diplomacy of the United States. In hindsight, do we wish somehow Ukraine had held on to those nuclear weapons, and they could be the deterrent rather than the United States or NATO?

GOTTEMOELLER: Guilty as charged. I was one of the members of the negotiating team that produced the so-called Budapest Memorandum under which Ukraine agreed to give up the nuclear weapons on its territory and become a non-nuclear weapon state under the NPT. I thought long and hard about this question, and I believe frankly, although the Ukrainians had a lot of very capable experts, it would have been a very difficult technical task back in 1993/1994 to actually acquire control of those nuclear weapons on its territory because they would have had to guillotine the centralized command and control system in Moscow and establish their own strategic command and control system based in Kyiv. If they had attempted that at the time, I think they would have ended up in an early conflict with Russia 30 years ago. Instead, what they bought was 30 years of independence and sovereignty to form themselves as an independent state, and they have proven their mettle in this current war with Russia. I mourn the fact that these two close neighbors are fighting each other. It's entirely Russia's fault. But I do think Ukraine is performing as capably as it is because it did not insist on wrapping itself in a nuclear flag 30 years ago, but instead focused its attention on sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence, and national capacity. And we see that today in how well they're fighting the Russians.

HANNAH: Where do we go from here? Will the nuclear saber rattling continue? And if so, what's to be done about it? To understand where we're going, we should first take a step back. After all, nuclear weapons have long been a focal point in relations between these two countries.

GOTTEMOELLER: I was a young girl in Columbus, Ohio, when the Soviets sent up their first satellite, Sputnik. And it turns out my father was interested in space technology, so he took me out of the front yard and pointed up and said, “See that little light moving across? The Soviets put up a satellite. Isn't that cool?” I turned into an enthusiast for studying Russian language. I was a Russian major at Georgetown University, and that was my ticket into the research community. I had the exceedingly good fortune to land at RAND Corporation in 1978 as the research assistant to their then senior Soviet military analyst, Colonel Thomas Wolfe, who was writing a book on the first Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement called The SALT Experience.

HANNAH: The treaty was a pretty big deal. Signed in 1972, it was the first time the United States and the Soviet Union sought to control the Cold War arms race. It placed restrictions on missile defense and the deployment of strategic nuclear weapons. It also ushered in a period of relaxed tensions between the two countries, known as détente. During the Obama administration, Rose would be at the forefront of another arms control experience as the first woman to negotiate a nuclear arms deal, a deal we know as New START. Like SALT, this treaty also came at a time when many were optimistic about the future of US-Russia relations.

GOTTEMOELLER: We had a brief hiatus in 2009/2010. President Dmitry Medvedev—remember him? He was in office in the Kremlin at that time. And there was a brief sense that we could truly have a reset in our relationship with the Russian Federation and have a productive area of cooperation, not only as far as nuclear weapons were concerned, but perhaps on a broader agenda as well. It didn't pan out that way. But during that period—2009/2010—we did have a positive environment.

HANNAH: But before we continue, let's back up again to address what you might be wondering, which is: If there's a New START, then there must be an Old START, right? This treaty was START I.

DAVID ARCENEAUX: START I was signed in 1991 at the end of the Cold War as that was coming to a conclusion, and the entire purpose was to limit what we call strategic nuclear capabilities. That's the nuclear stuff that country one can target country two’s homelands with. So, Russia and the United States being able to strategically target one another means they can blow up cities in one another's countries.

HANNAH: That's David Arceneaux, a nonresident fellow here at EGF. David's main gig is out in Colorado Springs, where he's an assistant professor of political science at the University of Colorado. He's an expert on all things nuclear weapons, but particularly nuclear weapons strategy and operations.

ARCENEAUX: So, what this did is basically took the unconstrained Cold War stockpiles and limited how many warheads and the types of stuff to deliver those warheads to 6,000 nuclear warheads—the parts that actually go boom—and then about 1,600 ICBMs—intercontinental ballistic missiles—and bombers. You need those things to get the warheads to target,which is kind of the shorthand version. So, START I was all about trying to reduce the ability of the United States and Russia to target one another's homelands. And by the early 2000s, 80% of all strategic nuclear warheads in the world had been dismantled as a result of this treaty. So, it had a huge effect in terms of just how much danger is floating out there in the ether.

HANNAH: A reduction in nuclear arms to that degree was huge, and it helped ease tensions between Russia and the United States in the aftermath of the Cold War. But that treaty had an expiration date, and this is where New START came in. It was recently renewed, but its 2026 expiration date is fast approaching. Failure to renew the treaty could be the death knell to American and Russian arms control efforts, which date back to SALT I.

Interlude featuring archival audio

ARCENEAUX: New START is the only remaining arms control treaty between the United States and Russia. We most recently saw the removal of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, INF. That was the one which limited the shorter-range missiles that can deliver nuclear weapons.

HANNAH: The only remaining arms control treaty between the United States and Russia is set to expire soon—really soon. And given nuclear tensions are at the highest they've been since the Cold War, it's unclear whether this treaty or a new one will be negotiated and ratified.

GOTTEMOELLER: New START could be extended again as it is written, as it exists, but it would have to go back before the US Senate for a new ratification process. So, if we have to go through the hassle of re-ratifying the New START treaty, then the United States really needs to get what it needs out of these negotiations. And the United States for many years has been clear that it wants to get limits on Russian nonstrategic nuclear warheads, so-called tactical nuclear warheads, and it wants to get constraints on these new exotic delivery vehicles like the nuclear-propelled torpedo that's out there and the air launched ballistic missile, the Kinzhal, that's out there.

In the past, they've talked again and again about wanting to get controls on US ballistic missile defenses and also controls on so-called prompt global strike, which are really long range, intercontinental range, highly accurate conventional missiles. Is that going to be their wish list this time around? I can't tell you yet, but I do think they're likely to be close to the top of the list.

HANNAH: The stakes are high, even though President Biden expresses confidence that Russia will not use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Russia still has that capability. Russia has the largest nuclear arsenal in the world—with many of these warheads of the so-called tactical variety—the means to deliver these weapons, and is developing new technology to modernize their nuclear forces. But now we get to the question underlying this whole episode. What, in the long term, is the United States to do about this?

ARCENEAUX: There's a range of options from “update and-add to everything” down to “update but simplify things.” And if you update but simplify, that's where you might free up some more resources to consider. And I think really the most interesting point is the ways in which these emerging technologies interact with the nuclear domain. There are ongoing workshops and discussions about what the role of artificial intelligence is in nuclear decision making. What can we say about things like these different delivery systems like hypersonic vehicles, etc.? Ballistic missile defenses—are they improving? And I think we should focus on things like quantum and artificial intelligence because they intersect with nuclear in a way that you need to be prepared to move quickly and respond to the political nature of threats. But that takes time and money to figure out, and if we're late to that game because we've just been buying more land-based missiles we may or may not meet need—and I'm just using that as one example—we might miss out on the more important strategic aspect.

HANNAH: How much should the United States invest in modernizing its nuclear arsenal? What role does diplomacy play today when tensions are only getting worse between Russia and the United States? And at a moment when China, too, appears to be developing a formidable nuclear force. I asked Rose for her take.

GOTTEMOELLER: For a start, let me assure both you and my listeners that I have been at the same table with Vladimir Putin, but I've never sat directly across from him as his counterpart in a negotiation. So, I do want to stress I've had a chance to, of course, observe him in a number of settings. The nuclear saber rattling is nothing new. When Russia invaded Crimea at his orders in 2014, at that time, Vladimir Putin was rattling the nuclear saber in very much the same way he's been doing since the full invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022. My take on this is that Vladimir Putin did not grow up in the discipline of the Communist Party's Central Committee. During the Cold War the Politburo and the Soviet leadership overall were incredibly disciplined about how they spoke publicly about nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence, especially after the close call in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Vladimir Putin came up through a much different system. He famously worked for the KGB all his life. He ended up leaving the KGB at a fairly low level, frankly. He was a lieutenant colonel equivalent. He did not have that discipline of leadership on matters related to nuclear weapons. And in my view, that is a factor here. He thinks they’re just any other instrument of power, I guess, to fling around when he needs to let people know he means business. It is, I think, very important that the United States, President Biden, and other international leaders—including Xi Jinping, by the way, and Prime Minister Modi of India—have conveyed to him in no uncertain terms, publicly, that these nuclear threats are unwarranted.

HANNAH: Absolutely. And Jake Sullivan is asked by various people what we're doing in response. And he tells Chuck Todd and others that the United States, on a peer-to-peer level, have communicated with a high degree of specificity to their Russian counterparts about what sort of catastrophic—and that's his term—consequences would ensue a nuclear attack by Russia. Do you have any insight, first of all, on what those consequences could be? And second of all, do you think it's a healthy thing that there is dialogue happening, that there is a channel between Washington and Moscow?

GOTTEMOELLER: It's absolutely vital at this time that we have an open line of communication between Moscow and Washington. This was a lesson, once again, learned during the Cuban Missile Crisis. We need the ability to mitigate crisis, to de-escalate if necessary. The so-called hotline was put in place to ensure US and, at that time, Soviet leaders always had the means to communicate, no matter how close they were to pushing the nuclear button. I think this kind of communication going on during this period is very important. I'm not implying the hotline is being used right now. I haven't heard it is being used, but they are using normal diplomatic channels. They are talking to each other via the top leaders like Jake Sullivan, talking to his counterpart, Patrushev, for example, the national security adviser. These are very, very good steps.

And the two leaders are also communicating, in a way, via their public statements. And Biden has been very, very clear about the extraordinarily serious consequences Russia would face and Vladimir Putin would face should a nuclear use take place. It's also important, I think, to emphasize at this point that what we've been worried about is a nuclear use related to the Ukraine war specifically. We're not talking about a central strategic exchange, in which the United States and Russia would exchange intercontinental ballistic missiles—that would really wreck huge destruction on our two countries and on the global environment overall. But nevertheless, I think the seriousness with which the Biden administration has messaged during this period points to the fact that one can never discount the possibility of such escalation, even from a single nuclear use. And that kind of risk is unwarranted, entirely unwarranted.

So, I think that's part of the message. It's not that the United States would escalate, by no means, but that things could get out of control. And therefore, it's very important to be thinking in those kinds of existential terms when one considers the use of nuclear weapons. When the Biden administration says serious consequences will be the result, I think they have in mind all instruments of national power—continued economic pressure on Russia, political condemnation, and yes, probably some military options as well. I don't believe a nuclear option would be on the table. That's my opinion. But I think it's been the right thing for the administration to say basically all options are on the table.

HANNAH: Interesting. And I realize this is more of a political than a policy question. I heard George Packer ask Jake Sullivan at an event—essentially in a democracy that's predicated on the will of the governed and the consent of the governed, do you in the National Security Council owe the American people some explanation—without giving away ways and means or sensitive information—on what that consequence might be. You laid out just now a slew of different possibilities, but do you think the administration should be somewhat transparent about what the American people can expect their government to do in response to a Russian nuclear attack on their behalf? Is that something we should have a public debate about, or is that just such a taboo subject that we should just leave it in the hands of experts?

GOTTEMOELLER: Two-part answer here. First of all, we are dealing with hypotheticals, and we can go down endless rabbit holes arguing about the hypotheticals in a way that, in my view, would not clarify or help people to understand what's going on but would further inflame anxiety in a way that's not warranted at this time. So, this business of trying to wrestle with hypotheticals is always a problem when you're facing such dire threats. But I think that is a right way to think about it. Yeah, you can wrestle with all kinds of hypotheticals, but are you ever going to get to a place where you're going to feel less anxious and more comfortable? My view is probably not.

But the other reason, I think, is more important. And that is—the essence of deterrence is to ensure that in the mind of one's counterpart, the potential aggressor, they have no uncertainty that you are going to respond, but they are in a state of maximum uncertainty about how you're going to respond. And so, therefore, they have to calculate the worst case. And I think that is very important. It's always been one of the, I would say, core principles from Schelling on out about the essence of deterrence. And so, I do think it's important to say all options are on the table; the consequences will be very severe. And leave the rest up to the imagination of Vladimir Putin.

HANNAH: Getting to your Foreign Affairs article, you are basically responding to a call by some in Washington that the United States should try to keep pace with the nuclear ambitions of Russia and of China. There is a way in which—you mentioned earlier Russia has the largest nuclear stockpile. The way into this article I'd really like to focus on is—my takeaway is: Your conclusion is that by trying to engage in an arms race with Russia as a response to its invasion of Ukraine, somehow the United States would be undermining its other efforts in a more technologically-focused competition with China, which might be more of an acute challenge for the United States in this moment. Is that an accurate characterization, or can you better summarize the main argument that the growth of a nuclear arsenal in the United States would come at the cost of modernization?

GOTTEMOELLER: Everybody's concerned right now about a new nuclear arms race, because it is true the Russians have modernized their nuclear arsenal, and they continue, obviously, to pour resources into ensuring their nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles remain very capable. The Chinese are now rapidly building up their nuclear capabilities, and according to Admiral Richard, the commander in chief of STRATCOM, he says they're going to quintuple their warhead numbers by the 2030s.

Now, I think we all need to remember that's quintupling from a low base. By some assessments, the Chinese have around 300 warheads. Others say 500 warheads. So, quintupling—we're looking at them coming up to a level of 1500 to 2500 warheads. That's what we're looking at, compared to the United States with over 4,000 warheads and with the Russians who have about 5,000 warheads. These are approximate numbers, but I'm just giving you the order of magnitude here.

There is a big difference between where China is and where they will be even when they've completed their warhead buildup. More concerning, I think, is the way the Chinese are building up their delivery vehicles. They've dug 300 new ICBM silos out in the western desert, north and east of Beijing. I think we're looking at two countries who are, at the moment, pouring resources into nuclear modernization. So, the question for the United States is: What's the best investment for the United States? My view is, to be honest with you, we're not ready to engage a nuclear arms race. We are just beginning our own nuclear modernization, which President Obama launched in 2016. I support it. I think it's the right thing to do to modernize our nuclear triad. But we have to get our own house in order in terms of our industrial capacity, our ability to build warheads and ballistic missiles, to get that back in order. And in the meantime, I think we need to think very carefully about what the answer is to the others engaging in nuclear modernization. Is it to build up quantity ourselves and engage in a nuclear arms race, or is it to look at where else the competition may be more important in this day and age? Nuclear weapons are 70 years old. They are an old technology. So are ballistic missiles. Where I am concerned we may see the Chinese surging ahead is in areas of newer technology, such as quantum computing, such as artificial intelligence, such as some of the cyber technology developments going on.

HANNAH: You sort of make the point in your essay that those technologies might make our nuclear weapons—might neutralize the deterrent potential for them, or that they might somehow render them obsolete to some extent. How would that happen?

GOTTEMOELLER: Absolutely. The new technologies, such as quantum sensing and artificial intelligence, our ability to rapidly analyze enormous amounts of big data—these developments could make our nuclear weapons systems much more vulnerable in years to come. Their survivability would come into question because they would be more subject to detection—and rapid detection in a way that might even allow them to be targeted, even if they're moving around, even if they are mobile assets. And that is the argument I make. If our nuclear weapons systems are going to become increasingly vulnerable as the years go by, is that where we really want to be pouring our money in? We need to keep our nuclear arsenals safe, secure, and effective. We need to have a reliable nuclear arsenal. But building more numbers is not, in my view, going to be the answer to the survivability challenge going forward. There, we have to be competing in that technology space. We have to be the ones also imposing survivability costs on our potential opponents.

HANNAH: Can you just give an example of what that looks like concretely? How does the possession or development of higher technology capabilities create that cost or prevent Russia's nuclear arsenal from being so menacing? Can you give either a hypothetical or a test case?

GOTTEMOELLER: Sure. The insurance policy the nuclear powers sustain as a so-called second strike retaliatory capability—the United States and Russia maintain what we call a balance of first strike capabilities. Some people call it the balance of terror because we have more or less equal numbers of missiles on a high level of alert. If one country—if Russia, for example, should try to launch a first strike on the United States, we would detected in time. So, the theory goes that we would be able to launch under their attack and basically retaliate no matter what. It's that finely balanced first strike capability between the United States and Russia which provides the first level of deterrence from our perspective.

But the Chinese have always depended on second strike retaliation. That is, they say, if someone dares to try to attack us with a first nuclear strike, we will keep safe and hidden enough nuclear missiles that we will be able to retaliate no matter what. So, going forward with newer technologies that have the ability to really, for example, keep track of mobile missiles as they are moving around—I'm talking about the ability not only to detect them, but also to track them in real time as they're moving around. This means a hard-won capability, mobile missile capability, that the Chinese have developed would become vulnerable to targeting and could be destroyed. I know the Russians, who have also made a big investment in their mobile missile systems, are also very concerned about this. So, it's the improvement in surveillance, the improvement in detection, and the improvement in targeting that would come about from the combination of more modern and capable sensor systems and the ability to do big data analysis and generate targets on a quick turnaround, maybe even a real time basis.

HANNAH: You mentioned in your article the United States will not be the one to launch a nuclear arms race, but it will respond to others who do. You're essentially saying it should not take the bait, and that calls to my mind, early on after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Putin changed the alert status of Russian nuclear weapons. And President Biden, in response, didn't respond in kind but simply pointed out to the United Nations and others that there was no threat facing Russia. Do you think this president is attentive to the destructive capability and the catastrophic consequences of nuclear escalation? And do you think he has shown restraint here in response to that recognition?

GOTTEMOELLER: That's a lot of questions in one sentence.

HANNAH: Oh, let me—

GOTTEMOELLER: No, that's fine. Let me let me answer in two parts. First of all, I like the way you put it that the United States should not take the bait with regard to the Chinese and the Russian nuclear modernization. I actually agree with that. We do not need to compete with them quantitatively as far as nuclear weapons are concerned in order to be able to defend ourselves and assure ourselves of an ability to retaliate no matter what. I think we need to think through carefully what our targeting requirements are going forward. But it's not all a quantitative question.

HANNAH: The final question to you: It has been the stated position of, I think, every president going back to John Kennedy to pursue a world without nuclear weapons. I assume your position is that is not a realistic or a possible end state that we see any time soon. But with the work you're doing now in advocating for modernization and investments in technologies, what is your ultimate objective? Do you see a world where nuclear weapons are powerless over newer technologies that might neutralize their threat? What is the thing that keeps your motor running? What is the ideal end state here?

GOTTEMOELLER: This modernization, in my view, is important. It's taking place while the New START treaty is in force, and it’s why I argue the New START treaty needs to be replaced by February of 2026. We also need to bring China into the equation now and look for ways to get them to the negotiating table. So, yes, modernization is important, but in my view it is justified if it is taking place under the limitations of an arms control treaty. And we're not embarking on a nuclear arms race and again building up and up and up. During the Cold War, we built over 32,000 warheads in the United States, and that was a big expenditure of national treasure we might have used better elsewhere.

HANNAH: I'm Mark Hannah, and this has been another episode of None of the Above, a podcast from the Eurasia Group Foundation.

Thanks so much to Rose Gottemoeller for joining us. I also want to quickly thank David Arceneaux, our nonresident fellow here at EGF, who lent us his expertize for this episode.

If you are a young and accomplished and ambitious academic like David, who studies US foreign policy or some aspect of it and enjoys conversations like these, do check out our job description for the next cohort of nonresident fellows at egfound.org.

Thanks as always to our None of the Above team. Our producer is Caroline Gray. Our associate producer and editor is Sarah Leeson, and Lucas Robinson provided research, writing, and archival support. If you enjoyed what you've heard, we would appreciate you subscribing to us on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or anywhere else you find podcasts. Please do rate and review, and if there's a topic you want us to cover, send us an email at info@noneoftheabovepodcast.org. Thanks for joining us.

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