A Critical Look at America’s Indo-Pacific Alliances

This podcast episode includes references to the Eurasia Group Foundation, now known as the Institute for Global Affairs.

Transcript:

SARANG SHIDORE: We are setting up a situation where it very quickly can escalate from a Philippines-China clash, localized, to something much bigger because of the presence of all these powers.

MARK HANNAH: Welcome to None of the Above, a podcast of the Eurasia Group Foundation. I'm Mark Hannah. This week, as President Biden meets with America's NATO allies in Europe, we've decided to look a bit further east to America's alliances in the Asia-Pacific—more specifically, its often-complicated relations with one of its oldest allies in the region, the Philippines.

Interlude featuring archival audio

HANNAH: In February, Washington and Manila announced an agreement which would give the United States access to four new military sites in the Philippines, on top of the five it already operates on a rotational basis. And in April, the two countries concluded their largest-ever joint military exercise.

The presence of US military in the Philippines is nothing new. The Philippines is a former American colony whose independence was recognized in 1946, and throughout the Cold War, Washington kept a military presence in the country in its efforts to contain communism. Though Manila expelled US troops from the Philippines in the 1990s, it has gradually walked back this decision over the past 30 years. Today, these new bases underscore just how much geopolitics in Asia have changed over the past few decades.

SHIDORE: This is a very old relationship. It's arguably the oldest alliance the US has in Asia, although Thailand has a claim based on a partnership. But this is a formal alliance. We have a mutual defense treaty. It has all the trappings and formalities of an alliance where both sides are closely intertwined and work together to meet common threats. So, in that sense, it's a pillar of the US presence in Asia.

HANNAH: That's Sarang Shidore. He's the director of studies and a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.

SHIDORE: And of course, the Philippines was a US colony as well. We shouldn't forget that after the Spanish-American War, the US took control of the Philippines and governed it for quite some time. And it's only been independent for about 70 years or so. So, there's a history here that goes deeper than just an alliance. Now, the question we have to ask is: what is the purpose of the alliance in our time? We have a different situation from the Cold War era. In the Cold War era, there was clearly a threat of communism across Asia. In fact, we had an insurgency. Back in the ‘50s, there was a communist insurgency in the Philippines––the Huk Insurgency––that was a potential threat to the Philippines state. And there were other insurgencies in other parts of Southeast Asia that were supported by China, that, in some cases, certainly were inspired by China, guided by China in many cases, and in some cases also armed. So, there was a rational reason why these states wanted US help and the US presence to the extent it was there, and the US played that role. It was mutually beneficial, although there were, of course, abuses in those relationships as well. But things are different now. So, the question now is whether the US-Philippines alliance has a role in terms of defending each other.

HANNAH: Though China's brand of communism may no longer have the same kind of ideological sway it once had, China is again the main issue that links together the security of the United States and the Philippines. China is more militarily and economically powerful than it ever was in the Cold War, and that makes it an important player in the region, which can't be easily ignored. This is especially true for the Philippines, whose territory in the South China Sea is claimed by China. The Philippines’ former president, Rodrigo Duterte, knew this, and instead of challenging China, he made moves to foster more amicable relations with Beijing, often at the expense of the United States.

Interlude featuring archival audio

SHIDORE: Duterte’s tone was very much a realist tone. It was not like he was a fan of China, per se, and he used to say that: “I'm not on the side of China, but we live next to China. We can get flattened by China if we're not careful. We’ve got to work with them.” He was looking for national survival, and he figured balancing was not beyond the point, really, not useful, that there was a need for adjustment of Philippines’ orientation to secure its interests.

HANNAH: Duterte's dalliance with China, however, did little to alleviate tensions over Beijing and Manila's maritime disputes in the South China Sea, which continue to boil. Just days ago, the Philippines spotted more than 40 Chinese fishing boats swarming a reef off its coast. Even the upcoming Barbie movie has become a point of controversy for its apparent depiction of the nine-dash line, which is used by Chinese maps to illustrate Beijing's claims in the South China Sea.

Interlude featuring archival audio

HANNAH: Filipino regulators are currently reviewing the film.

Meanwhile, Duterte's successor and current president, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., who's commonly referred to as Bongbong, who won office last year in a landslide, has sought to bolster ties again with the United States. Marcos is also the son of former Philippine president and dictator Ferdinand Marcos, Sr.

SHIDORE: Bongbong Marcos’ father was a strong US ally, strong supporter, worked very closely with the United States even before the Reagan administration. At the same time, though, it's not like he was just toeing the line, because he had his own views towards other countries in the region. But yes, in terms of security matters, geopolitics, the core issues, Philippines was very aligned to the US.

HANNAH: Given tensions with China, it may come as little surprise that Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., like his father, has aligned himself closely with the United States. It's also a move partially reflected in findings from our recent survey at the Eurasia Group Foundation of people across Asia. We found that nearly 82 percent of Filipinos have favorable views of the United States, whereas only 30 percent have a favorable view of China. The same survey also finds that US-China tensions have many in the Philippines worried. More than 80 percent think these tensions put their country's national security at risk. Though Sarang doesn't think a Chinese attack on the Philippines is imminent or even likely, he does see it as a possibility that the Philippines could get dragged into a US-China conflict over Taiwan.

SHIDORE: Well, you can imagine many scenarios. The extreme one, which is discussed in Washington a lot, is a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, like Putin's invasion of Ukraine, out of the blue all because of some visit by a US official or something of that sort, which we don't consider here as being very provocative, although the Chinese do. So, that's the scenario. From all the China experts that I read and follow who hardcore understand the Chinese Communist Party and intentions of Xi Jinping and so forth, that doesn't seem very likely that the Chinese will just bolt from the blue and invade Taiwan. And dates have been bandied around like 2027 and so forth.

But there are intermediate scenarios where there's a cascading cycle of provocation and counter-provocation that takes military forms as a crisis. We had what's called the EP-3 crisis in 2001 when a US surveillance plane was shot down by the Chinese. A crisis like that in which lives are lost could turn quite ugly. And then you get a crisis in the high seas or the crisis off the coast of China. That then can morph into a much bigger conflict. And again, you could also see more radical Taiwanese politics where they flirt more with independence, which provokes China. You could also see Chinese provocations of Taiwan that just step up, step by step, in a sort of assertive, aggressive way that forces the US to come closer to Taiwan. So, really, this is an equal opportunity landscape. All parties could—and in fact they could jointly or together—create cycles of provocation and counter-provocation. That leads us to something nobody wants to have in this region, which is a conflict between the US and China. And then in that case, the Philippines becomes much more relevant.

HANNAH: It's easy to see how quickly a cycle of provocation and counter-provocation could spin out of control. And this got me thinking about the expansion of America's military presence in the Philippines and elsewhere in Asia. Does it increase American security and the security of its partners and allies in the region, or does it risk provoking China?

SHIDORE: I would argue that the way the US has been going about the Asia security question is more provocative than not. This is about starting to transform the hub and spoke alliance system in Asia, which has historically been there, with the US having an alliance relationship with each ally, largely separately, and melding it into some kind of a bloc-like structure. So, you're seeing the US encouraging security and military interactions and interoperability between its core allies, which are Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Australia—these particularly, but also bringing India to an extent—and trying to forge a what starts looking like a bloc. It's not going to obviously be a NATO, but it definitely looks like kind of an armed encirclement to Chinese nationalist eyes and, indeed, to objective eyes as well. The question has to be asked: is this necessary? Are you really creating more reassurance through this process, or is this a provocation? Is this adding to deterrence, or is it going to only fuel Chinese suspicions and insecurities and cause them to respond, which, again, will be met with a counter-response and so forth?

HANNAH: America's system of alliances in Asia looks much different than its system in Europe, in which America and 30 other countries are joined together throughout the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO. In Asia, it is instead characterized by a series of country-by-country bilateral agreements with the United States.

Interlude featuring archival audio

HANNAH: But in recent years, America's alliances in Asia, at least from China's perspective, have appeared to be coalescing into a unified bloc, much like NATO, poised to encircle China.

SHIDORE: It is on its way to getting there, because, remember, we don't have, still, this kind of a fusion of allies. We are still partway through the process. So, it's certainly looking more and more like that. And I would say it's already crossed the threshold of deterrence to provocation, especially facts like AUKUS, the new move on what's called the EDCA sites—this is with the Philippines, with the four new US military sites in northern Philippines—and, indeed, the other things that are going on between bringing Japan into closer military cooperation with the Philippines, Australia.

Now, mind you, some of these things are also happening because some allies want it. Japan in particular does want to tie up with these other allies on its own. It would probably do it anyway, some of it at least. So, not all of this is Washington's doing. But I think all of this is sort of resonating in some kind of orchestra-like situation where some allies are very, very enthusiastic; others are less or are split, actually, internally. Philippines is the latter.

HANNAH: More Filipinos may have a favorable view of the United States than they do of China. But as Sarang hints, this doesn't necessarily correspond to enthusiasm for a greater military presence in their country and region. This leads to an important question at the heart of any alliance system. Can America's Asian allies be counted on to pull their weight? Might the Philippines return to its pro-China pivot under Duterte? And are other allies, rich countries like South Korea and Japan, free riding? In other words, is it possible that this system of alliance is, in fact, a liability?

SHIDORE: The cheap riding argument can be made for Japan, of course, because it's spending well below what it would spend if it were a normal country. And that's why the rearmament of Japan may be in the US interest. The worry I have is not that certain allies are taking measures to respond to what certainly has been a remarkable rise of China and its military modernization. You would expect rationally that they would do it. The question is whether we in the US are trying to put ourselves front and center of it. Or are we saying to let this happen because some of this is a good thing for the balance of power, but we will start thinking about how we lower our profile over time as the allies step up and thereby create a balanced Asia, but in a way that's much safer for the United States and, indeed, will be seen by China as less threatening. China, I think, is most worried about this bloc formation encirclement, and also it always talks about external powers shouldn't be here. Now, that's, of course, a no-go because the US will remain an Asian power for a long time to come. But the question is: can it shift its profile in Asia in a way that's safer? It doesn't have to be so present right up front in the face of China all the time.

HANNAH: I want to ask you more of an affirmative question, because it's harder to actually paint a positive picture of what the United States should be doing in Asia or what its posture should be vis a vis China, than it is to critique some of what I would agree are strategic blind spots and potential self-fulfilling prophecies around bloc formation and Cold War thinking. What do you think the United States policy should be in Asia.

SHIDORE: In the regional sense, I think it's very important for the US to stop doubling down on this bloc formation. That's effectively what it's doing. Bringing these allies together in the military sense, particularly, is, I think, very risky and provocative. I think it's one thing to bring them together in an economic sense to create deeper bonds. I think that's a good thing because many of these countries actually look up to the US model more than the Chinese model. And so, they would love us to play that role of a catalyst to bring them together. But when you start building joint interoperability and start doing exercises with more and more partners added, in ways that seem like it's meant to prepare for war with China, with all of these partners taking part, even if that may not happen, I think that's just excessive, and it's not helping.

There are clearly vital interests. The fact is the US is an Asian power because a lot of its territories are very close to Asia. It's also an Asian power because the US-Japan alliance is a core part of the US presence in Asia. Japan is a very large country. We have commitments there, and Australia is another ally with whom the US has very close ties. So, there are some allies in the region that I think are going to remain allies and should remain allies for some time to come. But you can ask again the question whether how much the United States should be taking a lead role in their defense and how much it should encourage them to step up more. And then you have allies like the Philippines that, honestly, if you think of a 50-year timeframe, and assuming China's rise continues, it becomes harder and harder to argue that the defense of the Philippines is a vital national interest of the United States. It may be a better idea for the US to start converting some of these alliances, like the Philippines or Thailand, into some other form of close security cooperation that doesn't involve mutual commitments for defense. And that's simply because China's rise is going to make it even more dominant, assuming it continues to rise. And we have to define what is worth defending, truly, in the national interest in a vital sense and what is not.

HANNAH: Are you suggesting some sort of promotion of strategic autonomy for these countries, these middle powers in Asia?

SHIDORE: Yeah, I think it would make sense to start looking at transforming at least a couple of these alliances into some other form of close support for their security, which would also encourage them to find their own ways of coexisting with China.

Alliances are not forever. They're historically contingent. There are people-to-people ties, but not all great people-to-people ties mean an alliance. There are many countries the US has very close ties with, but they're not security allies. We should start thinking in the United States in the future that is adjusted for a new power dispensation that the future will bring. Inevitably, power shifts occur. One has occurred in Asia, quite substantially, and we haven't shifted our military profile. If anything, we are digging in and doubling down on it, and that creates enormous risk.

HANNAH: You've mentioned in your writing the strategic autonomy that was pursued by Vietnam. Do you see that as a model for the Philippines?

SHIDORE: I think this is a fantastic question because if you compare Vietnam and Philippines, I think there you see the difference. In the case of Vietnam, they're very assertive on their maritime claims. They’re actually more assertive than the Philippines. They have a maritime militia of their own. They're very strong in the diplomatic sense, although the Philippines has stepped up on that as well now. And they make it very clear what their claims are, and they pursue them. Now, the other part of that is that they are an ally of none. So, they don't have a great power that's deeply entrenched in Vietnamese security structures. And what that means is, yes, you can get a Vietnam-China clash in the Philippines, but the risk of that turning into a great power war is almost zero.

HANNAH: But for Vietnam, doesn't it make it more likely that they're conquered by China than the Philippines?

SHIDORE: They've been doing a pretty good job of maintaining their autonomy. So, I think it's really policy and commitment and will. The Vietnamese are showing us that you can have an autonomous state. By the way, it's very close to China now in terms of economics and trade and so forth. They're getting, actually, more trade, more investment in recent years. And then again, you don't have that short circuit.

Now we’re committed in the Philippines to joint patrols with the Philippines to defend public vessels, aircraft, and so forth in the South China Sea, which are being discussed seriously. There's talk of Australia joining these joint patrols. We are setting up a situation where it very quickly can escalate from a Philippines-China clash, localized, to something much bigger because of the presence of all these powers, which cannot happen in the case of Vietnam. So, can the Philippines learn from Vietnam? Can we learn from Vietnam ourselves in the US?

HANNAH: Yeah. The risk of conflict, the risk of war—I don't want to put too fine a point on it, but you're suggesting that if our posture is completely out of date with or unmatched by the geopolitical reality in China's new rise, it's perilous, right?

SHIDORE: That's right. Just think of the numbers. In 1980, around 1978-79, when reform and opening started in China, China was essentially a peasant society. Today it’s a $17 trillion economy. It's growing at 9 percent a year, compounded, for 40 years straight. We are dealing with a China which is 70 percent of the US GDP when it was a few percent many decades ago. And wouldn't one expect that the balance of power, when it shifts so radically economically, that some adjustments to the military balance of power are inevitable?

HANNAH: What do you say to your detractors who will say, “Well, then you're suggesting America's cutting and running just because its primary geopolitical challenger in Asia is getting stronger?” Is that a sign of weakness? What do you say to that?

SHIDORE: No, it's a sign of defining what is really important to defend. And like I said, the alliance with Japan, the alliance with Australia, the Pacific territories—in the Pacific, the US has Guam, has other possessions. These are vital to defend. But that doesn't mean you have to defend all of Asia.

HANNAH: A powerful China means the United States must think carefully about what areas and countries in Asia are truly vital to its interests. As Sarang argues, the Philippines and Thailand may not fit the bill. Then there is Taiwan. Unlike the Philippines, which America has a long-standing commitment to defend, Taiwan is not an ally. Washington is, however, deliberately ambiguous on whether it would or would not come to its defense if it fell under Chinese attack.

SHIDORE: Taiwan, of course, is a different matter. Taiwan is a special case where a Chinese invasion is entirely possible, but Taiwan is not an ally. Remember that. And we do have to ask this question on Taiwan, as to whether Taiwan is a vital interest for the United States that is worth Americans dying for. Maybe it is. I don't want to give a give an answer because it's a difficult question to answer. But I think we assume Taiwan is an ally in our discourse today, and it is actually not formally an ally. And we are committing ourselves in ways that could come back to bite us. It's not about cutting and running at all, nor is it about bearing down and seeing it as an ally and bringing it into the US, let's say, de facto alliance structure. So, that sweet spot we have had for four decades of the one-China policy, strategic ambiguity, and so forth have served the region and the US well. And I think it's very important to return to those principles that are being eroded from both sides and to ensure Taiwan doesn't become a flashpoint, because it's the most risky flashpoint in Asia at this point.

HANNAH: All this discussion about the future of America's military posture in Asia leads to another important question. If the US were to take a less active military role in the Indo-Pacific, who would fill the void? Could an international organization like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, an economic and political union which often goes by its acronym, ASEAN, take on a more active leadership role in Asia?

SHIDORE: I think ASEAN has been put in a difficult situation because what it really wants is both the US and China to be there and leverage both of them for its benefit and its goals. ASEAN has an economic story to tell –– that of quite a lot of success in the last four decades. And it remains a very dynamic region that, except for one or two countries like Myanmar and maybe a little bit Laos, has been doing very well economically, and they don't want that magic to go away. And the source of this magic has been the rise of China and the US presence and investments and security, to an extent. So, they would like the old world to come back. They are also fans of globalization.

I think the messages are coming from ASEAN very loudly and very clearly. You're seeing it from Singapore. You're seeing it from Indonesia. You're seeing it in the way Vietnam practices its foreign policy. It's about having both countries in the region, and when they are in the region interacting in productive and peaceful ways. This is a message. And the broader message from them is that the US and China need to engage to tamp down the tensions. And so, they're using that. They’re using the bully pulpit, but I think they’re also using the card of attraction, the fact that they're a market now that's quite substantial. And by 2030, they will overtake Japan in terms of GDP and I believe, become the fourth largest economy in the world. It means the US has something to lose if the region becomes destabilized. It’s the ASEAN market and opportunities for US businesses that are at risk.

HANNAH: It was interesting that so many Filipinos, about 37 percent, which was a plurality in our survey, thought that ASEAN was the most influential economic player, more so even than the US or China. And you and your writing have mentioned how the Philippines is a sort of success story and is kind of on the vanguard of ASEAN.

SHIDORE: In recent years—it's a long story. Early decades, way back when—we're talking 1930s or even ‘50s—Philippines was seen as a more advanced country than the rest of Southeast Asia. And then what happened was some of the other countries caught up and overtook it. But now, again, Philippines is seeing quite good growth in the last couple of years. It's posted 7 percent or so, and they certainly are feeling very confident. But remember, they've also joined trade pacts that don't include the US, such as our RCEP, which is an ASEAN-led trade agreement in which China is a part, but also Japan and Australia and so forth.

HANNAH: As the United States and the Philippines strengthen their alliance, important questions remain about America's military posture across the Indo-Pacific. What are America's core interests in the region? Is America's expansive footprint more likely to do, potentially, more harm than good? What sort of American leadership is the most important for US interests in Asia and for the interests of its allies?

I’m Mark Hannah, and this has been another episode of None of the Above, a podcast of the Eurasia Group Foundation. If you want to learn more about how people in the Philippines, as well as people in Singapore and South Korea, think about alliances, about the United States, and about China, I encourage you to read our most recent international survey at egfound.org.

I want to thank Sarang Shidore for joining me. Special thanks also go out to our None of the Above team. Our producer is Caroline Gray. Our associate producer and editor is Sarah Leeson. Lucas Robinson provided research, writing, and archival support. If you enjoyed what you've heard, we'd appreciate you subscribing on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or anywhere else you find podcasts. Do rate and review us, and if there's a topic you want us to cover, send us an email at info@noneoftheabovepodcast.org. Thanks for joining us. Stay safe out there. See you next time.

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