Episode 11: Is a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan Inevitable?

The Future of Cross-Strait Relations and Washington’s Commitments to Taipei

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, observers anxiously watched China’s reactions as many feared a similar conflict would break out in the Taiwan Strait. In recent years, it appears China has been increasingly determined to enforce its One-China policy, first against Hong Kong and now against Taiwan. From afar, the United States is caught between deterring China from an all-out military conflict and supporting a democratic Taiwan. A few months ago, President Joe Biden broke away from America’s traditionally ambiguous stance and said the US would defend Taiwan if China attacks. However, Eurasia Group Foundation’s annual survey found that the number of Americans who support US intervention to help Taiwan is waning. So, how likely is it that a conflict between China and Taiwan breaks out? Is it possible for the US to navigate conflicting interests without resorting to involving itself in another war? In this episode, EGF senior fellow Mark Hannah sits down with Bonnie Glaser of the German Marshall Fund to discuss the state of US-China relations and the future of Taiwan.

Bonnie Glaser is the managing director of the Indo-Pacific program at the German Marshall Fund. Glaser has worked at the intersection of Asia-Pacific geopolitics and US policy for more than three decades.

This podcast episode includes references to the Eurasia Group Foundation, now known as the Institute for Global Affairs.

Transcript:

BONNIE S. GLASER: I don't see US-China military conflict as inevitable, but I do think it's going to be increasingly difficult to manage the intense competition between the United States and China.

MARK HANNAH: Welcome to None of the Above, a podcast of the Eurasia Group Foundation. My name is Mark Hannah. This past weekend, the United States and Taiwan deepened their economic ties.

Interlude featuring archival audio

HANNAH: These talks, which serve as a precursor to a potential free trade agreement between Washington and Taipei, could help the self-governing island rely more on the United States and less on China. But deteriorating economic relations between Taiwan and China don't come without their complications.

GLASER: I think economic interdependence between China and Taiwan is an important factor in this equation. China would harm itself enormously if it uses force against Taiwan.

HANNAH: That's Bonnie Glaser, managing director of the Indo-Pacific program at the German Marshall Fund. Bonnie explains how economic interdependence between China and Taiwan is an important factor in maintaining good relations and preventing an all-out military invasion of Taiwan by China.

GLASER: That said, I think if China believed Taiwan was separating from China, this was a very dangerous moment, that Taiwan would become a separate entity. It would be recognized by the United States, Japan, and its allies, and this would be almost irreversible. And it would be extremely damaging to the Chinese Communist Party at home. I don't think their economic dependence on Taiwan would prevail in their decision-making. So, I do think China would, under certain circumstances, use force against Taiwan. I think they do have red lines, and I think we do have to take those red lines seriously.

HANNAH: But let's take a step back. Why has there been so much tension over Taiwan lately?

GLASER: Taiwan, China, and the United States all have different views on Taiwan’s status.

HANNAH: Since 1949, following a decades-long civil war in which the Communists ultimately defeated the nationalists and took control of China, Taiwan has been governed independently, but China still views Taiwan as its own territory. China feels it will one day reunify with Taiwan based on its ‘One-China’ principle. In Taiwan, it's not quite as clear. Leaders of this young democracy all have different views on the island's relationship with mainland China, but mostly Taiwan views itself as autonomous. Meanwhile, the United States has historically maintained an unofficial relationship with Taiwan, where it recognizes Taiwan as part of China—as part of that ‘One-China policy’—but yet it sells weapons to Taiwan, a policy that's become known as ‘strategic ambiguity.’

GLASER: The United States has long taken a position that it does not support independence for Taiwan. It insists the differences between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China be resolved peacefully through dialogue, not through coercion and not through the use of force. And so, Taiwan sees itself as an independent sovereign state. Beijing sees Taiwan as part of China. The United States believes Taiwan's sovereignty and its status remains unsettled after the end of World War II.

HANNAH: But that ambiguity has gotten muddled as China ramps up its military exercises near Taiwan and as the United States establishes closer ties with the island—the latest round of trade talks being just one example.

Interlude featuring archival audio

HANNAH: So, as the United States and Taiwan get closer and as tensions rise between China and Taiwan and between China and the United States, how likely is it that tensions spiral out of control? Can all of these competing interests be managed diplomatically? Or is a Chinese invasion of the island—a full-out war—inevitable? Bonnie has her thoughts.

GLASER: Ideally, I think we would all like it if Beijing would just let Taiwan decide its own future. But that's probably not going to happen in the near term. It's just not realistic. So, the alternative is essentially to kick the can down the road—to protect Taiwan's current ambiguous status with all of its autonomy, because Taiwan is unlike Hong Kong, of course. It elects its own leaders. Beijing was able to exert control over Hong Kong via the passage of a national security law. It could not do that in Taiwan. And so, ultimately, I think it is in the US interest to create an environment in which China believes using force against Taiwan is too costly, and therefore it has to rethink its entire approach to managing its relationship with Taiwan. Beijing has been very stubborn, very unbending, insisting Taiwan accept its version of what it calls the ‘One-China’ principle. And so, under Xi Jinping, this has become even more difficult to resolve. But frankly, under prior Chinese leaders, their positions were not all that different. So, the hope is that in the future we get a leader in China who is willing to pursue a different approach to Taiwan. But it's just very difficult to see that happening in the next few years.

HANNAH: It's almost fashionable to some extent in certain policy circles in Washington, DC, to suggest war with China is inevitable, that a rising power and a relatively declining power are bound for conflict at some point in the future. And many are suggesting Taiwan is going to be the potential impetus for that. But you don't think there is such a strong likelihood of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in the near future. Why do you think an imminent invasion is improbable?

GLASER: First, I want to underscore that I do not think a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is inevitable. I do believe it's possible. And I think we have to do more to strengthen deterrence and to let China know it would be very costly if they invade Taiwan. We have to have the military capability to prevent them from doing so. We do not have that today. And Taiwan needs to bolster its capabilities to prevent the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] from landing on the beach and seizing control of the island. So, there's a lot of work to be done in order to ensure that invasion doesn't take place.

But I think my basic analysis is that the costs of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan are very high. If the PLA were to attempt to take over Taiwan and fail, that could put at risk Xi Jinping's position in power. It might even reduce the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and its rule in China, potentially even leading to its demise if the Chinese Communist Party were to fail to take over Taiwan.

HANNAH: Can we can we talk about that for a second? Because a lot of people in the early months of the Russian war in Ukraine were saying if the United States doesn't help out as proactively as it could by coming to the aid of Ukraine, by instituting a no-fly zone, etc., that China's watching. And they're thinking maybe if the West's response to the war in Ukraine is anemic, maybe this is their moment to strike. What you seem to be saying is the inverse of that, which is: China might also be watching to see how badly Putin might be being delegitimized at home or how badly Russia is being ostracized by other countries in the international community.

GLASER: If anything, the experience of Russia in Ukraine, I think, has reinforced Chinese defense planning against Taiwan. That is, if they are to launch an attack against Taiwan, it should be a very large-scale attack, and they should try to take Taiwan as quickly as possible to prevent the United States from intervening. They should use decapitation strikes to try to take out Taiwan's leadership so they don't end up with a Zelensky-type individual who is able to muster or mobilize the international community to support Taiwan. I think where there are lessons—and there will be some, maybe even tactical battlefield lessons that can be learned by the PLA—I think they probably reinforce China's existing plans.

I wanted to add something to the question we were talking about previously, about the reasons why I think a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is not very likely. Xi Jinping's most important priority is national rejuvenation. It's what he calls the Chinese dream, the restoration of China to greatness, which he has said should be achieved by the middle of this century. And I think an invasion of Taiwan potentially puts that at risk. So, even though he has said reunification is a requirement for rejuvenation, and so, some people view that as a deadline, that there must be this integration of Taiwan with mainland China by 2049, which is the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, I tend to not see it as a hard and fast deadline. I see it as a target to work towards. And I'm not convinced that the failure to take over Taiwan would prevent the attainment of rejuvenation. I mean, let's face it. Xi Jinping could turn around tomorrow and say China has now achieved national rejuvenation, because they haven't set out any clear benchmarks for what that means. He has said China has to become the leading technological power in the world, for example. Well, that's something that's going to be difficult to achieve as well.

So, if you look at all of the problems Xi Jinping faces at home—some of them very near-term, such as dealing with the end of zero COVID and the slowdown of the Chinese economy, and the longer-term issues such as the demographic challenges China faces—all of these, to me seem to be very, very difficult things Jinping has on his plate. And I don't see how trying to take over Taiwan in the near-term is going to help him do that.

HANNAH: And yet, as you have written, the military pressure Xi Jinping has exerted on Taiwan has only increased in recent years. So, what I'm curious about is if Beijing calculates that Washington is maybe war weary and tired of fighting these wars in the Middle East and is starting to develop its own semiconductor industry in Arizona, and other things, why would he go to the trouble of exerting this increased military pressure if there wasn't an intent to invade or to take Taiwan back by force? What political goal or geopolitical goal is that increased pressure trying to pursue?

GLASER: I think, first of all, you have to look at all of China's pressure on Taiwan, not just the military pressure. And you have to look at this over a period of years as China's toolbox to coerce Taiwan has expanded. We've seen diplomatic coercion. We've seen some economic coercion. That's relatively limited, but it's growing. We see more cyber-attacks by the Chinese against Taiwan than any other target in the world. So, yes, there's a whole lot of coercion against Taiwan. The goal, in my view, is to deter Taiwan independence. And I think this has been Beijing's top priority for many years—to prevent Taiwan from becoming an independent sovereign state, for changing its constitution, for example, changing its name from the Republic of China to Taiwan. Actually, Taiwan's constitution defines its geographical boundaries of the Republic of China, which includes not only mainland China, but actually Mongolia. And any attempt to change the constitution and the definition of the geography of Taiwan—that also would be viewed as a declaration of independence. And of course, Beijing wants to prevent the United States and other countries from recognizing Taiwan as an independent sovereign state. So, the question—

HANNAH: There's an interesting point there, too, because a lot of talk is, I think, very US-centric here. And if Beijing's primary goal is to avoid Taiwanese independence, the biggest determinant, I imagine, of whether Taiwan does try to make that declaration of independence is the political leadership of Taiwan itself. So, the question I have for you is: to what extent does Taiwanese political leadership affect the possibility of a conflict?

GLASER: Well, first, let me add just one thing to my prior answer, and that is: the question today is whether China has moved beyond its top priority of preventing Taiwan from declaring independence to coercing Taiwan and compelling it to unify with China. And I believe the priority is still deterring an independence in Taiwan. But China is beginning to move towards coercing Taiwan to become part of China. And so, I think, again, there's a debate over whether they've abandoned the goal of deterring independence and are just now seeking to compel a unification and actually set a target for that.

Now, in answer to your question about the political leadership in Taiwan, I think that's actually extremely crucial as a variable that will determine Beijing's approach to Taiwan going forward. If there is a party in Taiwan that has the potential to be in power and ultimately engage in political talks with mainland China and come to some kind of an understanding—and it may be different from Taiwan completely embracing Beijing's one-China principle. Maybe there are other options eventually out there—then I think that's actually China's preference. I don't think China wants to resolve the Taiwan issue through use of force. It is reasonable, however, to question whether or not that is achievable because there is less and less support in Taiwan, if you look at public opinion polls in recent years, for any kind of reunification with China. So, some people argue China has abandoned hope in working with the Nationalist Party known as the KMT in order to achieve reunification. I'm not sure that is true, but I would certainly argue that the KMT does have a chance of coming back to power. Elections will be held just one year from now. In Taiwan, the presidential election is January 2024. There is certainly a possibility that the KMT could be could return to power. And if it does that, I'm confident they will not run on a platform of reunification with China. But part of their platform is to restore dialogue with China and to try to manage differences peacefully. And that might lead to diminished alarm in Beijing about the possibility for independence, and it might ultimately lead to reduced concern in the United States that China is inevitably going to use force against Taiwan. So, I actually think that is a very important variable which could shape how the risk of conflict evolves in the future and how the US-China-Taiwan relationship evolves over the next few years.

HANNAH: We've had on Susan Thorton and Ryan Hass. We've had on Isaac Stone Fish—people with very different opinions about the US-China relationship. Do you see it as a zero-sum conflict or an area where China's gains and regional influence are necessarily threatening to the United States and its interests?

GLASER: I increasingly think there are many US and Chinese interests that are incompatible, but I do not think that overall it must be a zero-sum relationship. And I don't see, as I said earlier, US-China military conflict as inevitable. But I do think it's going to be increasingly difficult to manage the intense competition between the United States and China. The Chinese view the current international system as in many ways unfavorable to China, as it was put in place after World War II by the United States and its allies. It is underpinned by liberal norms that China doesn't accept. US alliances are integral to this system, and China sees those alliances as dangerous. And so, even though the international system enabled the rise of China, and so, it served its interests for a very long time economically, China now wants to make some adjustments in that system. I don't think they necessarily want to overthrow it and start over, but they do want to make changes that will be more, I think, favorable to them.

And we see this taking place in some places in the United Nations, for example, in the Human Rights Council. We see this taking place in how China is trying to change the ways of approaching the use of the Internet. They oppose allowing Internet freedom, of course. They've basically created their own intranet because they block so many websites and block the access of the Chinese people to many of the websites. They curtail the freedom of their own citizens. So, I think China is pursuing its interests in ways that are harmful to the United States. So, yes, it's not just Taiwan. It's also in the South China Sea, in the East China Sea. China is seeking to set up more military access points. We can debate whether you want to call them bases—but in places like the South Pacific and possibly in Western Africa. I have concerns about China's ambitions. And I believe the United States and its allies need to work harder to protect our interests and prevent China from damaging those shared interests.

HANNAH: The final question I'll ask is: do you think the Taiwan Relations Act is inconsistent? Is the US being party to that inconsistent with the US supporting a ‘One-China’ policy, inherently?

GLASER: The Taiwan Relations Act is consistent with the longstanding US policy of strategic ambiguity. It is inconsistent with a position of strategic clarity that is giving Taiwan an ironclad commitment that we would defend it under all circumstances. The Taiwan Relations Act clearly states the United States has a commitment to sell defensive weapons to Taiwan, but it says nothing about the United States coming to Taiwan's defense. There is a provision in the Taiwan Relations Act, which is more of a statement of policy, which says the United States must maintain its own capability in the Western Pacific—that is, our military capability to prevent Chinese coercion against Taiwan. Arguably, we have failed to do that, and that's on us. That is on the United States. But that has nothing to do with whether or not the United States might be required to come to Taiwan's defense. So, I think on that point of strategic clarity, that would be inconsistent with the Taiwan Relations Act.

I believe the TRA [Taiwan Relations Act] is a fairly flexible document. It has stood the test of time. It has enabled the United States to pursue a range of policies with Taiwan and expand its relationship with Taiwan. Some people would say we have done so in ways that are inconsistent with the ‘One-China’ policy. I personally don't think having the Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, visit Taiwan was a violation of our ‘One-China’ policy, nor was it a violation of the Taiwan Relations Act. I do think it was inadvisable. I think it led to a series of Chinese military exercises and actions against Taiwan that have been very harmful to Taiwan's security so that Taiwan is less secure in the aftermath of that visit than it was before.

HANNAH: Sort of a blowback from a well-intentioned show of support that undermined ultimately.

GLASER: These kinds of symbolic actions by the United States—and Taiwan very much likes the United States to give them symbolic signs of support. And sometimes we need to do that; we need to demonstrate that we support Taiwan and show its public that we care about Taiwan security, as well as signal that to Beijing. But I feel we should not do so in ways that would be very harmful to Taiwan’s security. And there are examples where the United States has done that. And I think in the future we should refrain from doing so.

HANNAH: I'm Mark Hannah, and this has been another episode of None of the Above, a podcast of the Eurasia Group Foundation. Thanks so much to Bonnie Glaser for joining us today.

Thanks also go out to the None of the Above team. Our producer is Caroline Gray. Our associate producer and editor is Sarah Leeson. If you enjoyed what you've heard, we would appreciate you subscribing to us on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or anywhere else you find podcasts. Please rate and review us. If there's a topic you want us to cover, send us an email at info@noneoftheabovepodcast.org. Thanks for joining us.

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