Episode 15: The Powell Paradox

Ravi Agrawal on How Colin Powell’s Mixed Legacy Lives on in the Biden Era

What impact did Colin Powell, America’s 65th secretary of state under President George W. Bush, who passed away last week, make on US foreign policy? What is the legacy he leaves behind, and how does it inform where the United States is headed? This week, the Eurasia Group Foundation’s Mark Hannah is joined by Ravi Agrawal, Editor in Chief of Foreign Policy magazine to discuss Powell’s lasting impact. Though much remains to be seen, Agrawal assesses the defining attributes of an emerging Biden doctrine -- from confronting China’s ascendence and the spread of autocracy, to a focus on domestic issues and a possible revival of Powell’s professed -- if not actualized -- principles of judicious prudence.

To listen to previous episodes and learn more about None Of The Above, go to www.noneoftheabovepodcast.org. To learn more about the Eurasia Group Foundation, please visit www.egfound.org and subscribe to our newsletter.

Ravi Agrawal is Editor in Chief of Foreign Policy magazine. Previously, he worked for CNN in various roles on three different continents, and is the author of India Connected: How the Smartphone Is Transforming the World’s Largest Democracy.

This podcast episode includes references to the Eurasia Group Foundation, now known as the Institute for Global Affairs.

Archival audio:

From 2003: Colin Powell Addresses United Nations Security Council On Iraq (NBC News, October 18, 2021),
CNN Official Interview: Colin Powell now regrets UN speech about WMDs (CNN, November 15, 2010).
Reflecting on Colin Powell’s life and legacy (CBS News, October 18, 2021)
Maddow: Colin Powell Impact On U.S. History Was Profound, Complex, And Tragic (MSNBC, October 19, 2021)
Biden criticized over US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan (Good Morning America, August 21, 2021)
Chuck Todd: Biden’s Handling Of Afghanistan Withdrawal Is ‘Catastrophic' (TODAY, August 22, 2021)
Biden Hits Back Against Criticism Of Afghanistan Withdrawal (MSNBC, August 19, 2021)
Biden Defends Decision To Withdraw From Afghanistan (NBC News, August 31, 2021)

Transcript:

October 26, 2021

RAVI AGRAWAL: Think of democracies not as something that is a finished product, not as something that is necessarily perfect. I think the very strength of a democracy is that it can be self-correcting and that it can be reflective and that it can own up to mistakes.

MARK HANNAH: Welcome to None of the Above, a podcast from the Eurasia Group Foundation. My name is Mark Hannah. Last Monday, the former secretary of State, Colin Powell, passed away at the age of 84 from COVID 19 complications. It was a tragic loss of a singular figure, a respected statesman who broke through so many barriers to serve in some of the most senior roles in the U.S. government. But his legacy is complicated by a central role he played in one of the worst and most consequential U.S. foreign policy blunders in modern history.

AGRAWAL: I think the sad reality is he will be remembered for what he himself acknowledges as his worst moment in public life, which was him presenting concocted evidence to the United Nations in 2003—evidence suggesting there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and that was the smoking gun, as it were, for the United States to go in unilaterally.

HANNAH: That's Ravi Agrawal. Ravi is the editor in chief of Foreign Policy, which bills itself as the global magazine of news and ideas. He's an award winning news producer, having worked at CNN for more than a decade in roles which took him across the world.

AGRAWAL: Of course, he acknowledged later that it was a mistake, and he was ashamed of having been put in that position and having gone ahead with it.

Interlude featuring archival audio

AGRAWAL: It takes guts to say that and to own up to that, and I think and hope we won't forget some of his other contributions to U.S. public service and to the military. I mean, let's not forget he was the first black person to be in that position—to hold all the roles he held as National Security Advisor, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and as Secretary of State. And I think perhaps in a strange way, his legacy may well be the Powell Doctrine, which he wasn't allowed to follow himself. But the Powell Doctrine basically states U.S. military force should be used under very specific conditions, and it should be brought to bear on an enemy only if there are overwhelming numbers on America's side, in situations where victory is almost absolutely certain and where you have a clear exit strategy. And you would do all of this not unilaterally, but with international support. The bizarre thing is Iraq was the absolute opposite of that. There was no multilateral support. There was no exit strategy. Victory was not certain at all. The numbers were overwhelming, but that was about it.

HANNAH: The tragedy of Colin Powell is that he cultivated a reputation for evenhanded prudence, even for restraint.

Interlude featuring archival audio

HANNAH: But in the patriotic surge after the attacks on 9/11, the need to do something was then put on him.

Interlude featuring archival audio

HANNAH: He compromised his beliefs and hopped aboard a bandwagon which is headed for the ill-fated invasion of Iraq in 2003. The paradox is that his belief—that force should only be used as a last resort in instances where the U.S. had a vital national interest—proved wiser year after painful year, as the U.S. became mired in Iraq and destabilized the greater Middle East.

AGRAWAL: What is that legacy now? If you look now at the acknowledgment, I think, in our community and in the media, Iraq was a mistake, or at least the way in which it was conducted was a mistake. And you look at the reaction and the way in which the restrainers in the “end forever wars” lobby, and the contingent of pundits have seemingly won that debate about the role of U.S. power. We're now back at the moment, I think, in which the Powell Doctrine is back in play. It seems like the Powell Doctrine is alive and kicking, despite the great man himself not being around. That's his legacy.

HANNAH: There's a link between President Biden and Secretary Powell, not just a personal connection and friendship the two men have developed from long years of public service, despite opposing political views, but a stronger link that Powell's legacy—the Powell Doctrine, as it were—the one he didn't quite actualize, is potentially one President Biden might be carrying out today. So, Ravi, I guess my question to you is: if Biden is forming his own doctrine to apply to the challenges he faces today, what does that look like?

AGRAWAL: There was a realization, I think, from the start that the endless wars—the forever wars—were hurting more than they were helping. And part of this, I think, was driven by public polling and an understanding that the war in Afghanistan was increasingly unpopular and expensive, and there was wide national support for getting out.

That the process of getting out was completely botched is a separate issue. And I think even the restrainers will admit the process could have been handled in a much better way. It could have been signaled in a clearer way that a small force could have been left behind, that there were ways in which allies could have been looped in earlier. The critiques, in a sense, are endless. I think the critiques of the pullout and the method of the pullout are valid.

Interlude featuring archival audio

AGRAWAL: But on the larger issue of pulling out, I think that is largely consistent with the Biden Administration's policies, and I think it ties into the broader strategy.

HANNAH: For Ravi, President Biden's decision to withdraw from Afghanistan is consistent with his administration's larger foreign policy strategy—that is, to turn America's attention away from the forever wars and toward building institutions, both at home and abroad, to better serve the United States, its interests, its allies, and the American public.

AGRAWAL: If I had to describe U.S. foreign policy under President Biden, I think it's very “domestic first,” in a sense. I would say it's, “Foreign policy begins at home.” That seems to me the primary impetus behind a lot of the Biden Administration's decision making, the way they see the world, the way they want to think about what's in this for America before really assessing any other kind of grand foreign policy strategies or ideas or imperatives.

HANNAH: Yeah, that characterization sounds quite similar to the previous administration's focus, right? President Trump had his “America first” agenda. Is this not the same in some regard?

AGRAWAL: If you put them both together—and I don't think the two are the same. I think of late there's been a trend among the foreign policy commentariat to say Trump and Biden have essentially the same foreign policy. I don't think that's entirely accurate. But if you take the basic “America first” impetus as sort of a starting point for vocalizing the notion that domestic interests are paramount, I think the key here is not so much in how this is always the case, how that should always be the way in which one thinks of any policy, foreign or domestic or energy or anything else. But I think it's more of an admission that the way in which foreign policy was conceived and executed in the past didn't quite work out. And this is where it begins to get a bit fuzzy because I think it's not just foreign policy. I think what the Trumpists and now the Biden administration are thinking about when they think of what didn't work in the past—I think what they're actually referring to is trade, as well as the fact that globalization and urbanization and the rise of technology's importance in our lives—all of these forces combined have led to certain changes in societies, not just in America, but around the world. You look at the loosening of communities in every small town and village in America, but also around the world. You look at the tug of urbanization. You look at the growing disenchantment with capitalism around the world, not just in America. And I think those are often described in the Trumpian rhetoric of the last four or five years, and it has been picked up by this administration as well that something wasn't working in the past. So, a need to correct, a need to readdress, a need to not do stuff like the Iraq War.

HANNAH: There's a correction that's happening. This recognition that the past two decades of America's expansive military commitments—the approach which Colin Powell warned us against but also regretfully supported—paired with changes in the global economy, might not have been serving the interests of much of the American public. And that is defining President Biden's agenda. Beyond this “domestic first” approach, as Ravi calls it, President Biden—according to our guest—has two main priorities.

AGRAWAL: One would be seeing China as a competitor and in a sense, either building bulwarks against China—so, you have the likes of AUKUS or the Quad, which is an alliance of India, Japan, Australia, and the United States. It's either that—building bulwarks—or advancing competition in other arenas, such as tech or cybersecurity or trade issues. That seems to be one central focal point for the Biden Administration.

The second—and it's not unrelated—is the idea of pitting or maybe separating democracies from autocracies—the sense of having a vision or an appeal for what a democracy is or could be, versus the appeal China might present, especially to some countries in Asia and Africa, which might see that model as more seductive or at least more useful in the short term. If you take those two broad things—aligning against China and trying to position democracies as superior to other forms of government—that seems to me, in some sense or the other, to be the broad way the Biden Administration is positioning its foreign policy.

HANNAH: Yeah, as you say, a big piece of the foreign policy landscape confronting President Biden is the ideological contest between autocracy and democracy. And recently it feels like democracies around the world, including our own, are displaying their imperfections.

Interlude featuring archival audio

HANNAH: What do democracies have going for them that they can use—that President Biden can use—to get back on track?

AGRAWAL: The way to frame this is to think of democracies not as something that is a finished product, not as something that is necessarily perfect. I think the very strength of a democracy is that it can be self-correcting and that it can be reflective and that it can own up to mistakes and that it can say, “X went wrong. We're going to fix X, and we're going to fix it through P, Q, and R manners. Or if it all goes pear-shaped, we'll have another election, and we'll let the people decide.”

I think one of the mistakes many people make when they consider democracy is to think of it as a finished product. But the reality is democracy has always evolved. There are so many different experiments underway to see whether democracies, or democracy itself, can be reformed. I mean, you think of citizens assemblies, for example, or you think of certain parts of the world that are considering changes to the voting age, either capping it at the upper level or lowering it to include, say, 17-year-olds. If you look at all of those things in sum, and if you look at democracy the way I'm describing it—as more of an evolving ideal, as a self-reflective ideal, as one that comes warts and all—I think it can be seen as something with much more soft power and much more appeal than any alternative. Look, after all, America still attracts—or at least before the pandemic it did, or maybe even before the Trump Administration—it still attracted upwards of 75,0000 immigrants every year. People want to come here. There is something seductive about America. There's something powerful about its soft power, and some of that is democracy. They vote with their feet, as I did several years ago. And they do that—we do that—because America's soft power works. And if you think about it in that way, warts and all, this works. If you present it in an open way with all its flaws and all its adaptability and flexibility, it can be a more enduring and appealing alternative to any other vision. But that's how it needs to be presented. So, I don't think America needs to shy away from, say, the pockmarks of January 6. I think it needs to say, “Yeah, this was bad, and we're going to fix it.” The key is you have to fix it.

HANNAH: We've discussed on this podcast before how a big part of what led us to war is not just the bad decisions of policymakers and political leaders, but also the American media culture, which helps accelerate the drumbeat to war—or at least it did in Iraq and Afghanistan. At that time, you were just a student, but today you find yourself in a powerful position within the media, in a position to help journalists and editors learn from the mistakes of twenty years ago. So, as President Biden and the United States face this new set of challenges and issues, what are some of the ways you as a gatekeeper and others in your position can ensure the mistakes of the past are not repeated?

AGRAWAL: I think if you look at the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq, there is little doubt that the voices heard back then—twenty years ago and eighteen years ago, respectively—were overwhelmingly Western, overwhelmingly American. And there were so many missing perspectives of smart, intellectual thinkers from Singapore or India or Nigeria, who may have had different takes. And those are takes we often try to publish in Foreign Policy, and we’re very committed to hearing what smart thinkers around the world might have to say and how they analyze certain situations. But yeah, in general, I do think one of the failings in our Western media ecosystem is an inability to be able to have more reporting on the ground from other parts of the world and to elevate voices that don't necessarily speak in fluent English. TV is a medium—and I’ve spent some years in TV, so, I get this—that necessarily elevates eloquence and presentability over substance. This is not something TV deliberately tries to do, but it's a feature of the medium. It's something I think for all of us as journalists, gatekeepers, foreign policy thinkers, and practitioners to keep in mind. But in general, it's fair to say the media and gatekeepers at the media shaped discourse. Discourse can sometimes be illuminating. It can sometimes be polarizing. It can sometimes be useful as a feedback loop for policy, and sometimes it can constrain and restrict policy. Media does all of those things, and I think any gatekeepers at any media institution need to be humble enough to recognize these things, also to recognize the limits of their power—I don't think us gatekeepers are as powerful as sometimes we like to think we are—but equally, to recognize that in general, we can all do better in terms of how we assess the global mood, in terms of the different voices we represent and the people who get to write for us.

HANNAH: Let's hope the diversification of voices and views, something which Ravi is actively working toward at his magazine Foreign Policy, helps prevent other major missteps. It will be interesting to watch and see whether a Biden Doctrine, which seems ever more oriented around China's rise and the success of democracies around the world, including our own, leads us in the right direction.

Thank you very much to our guest, Ravi Agrawal, for joining us.

I’m Mark Hannah, and this has been another episode of None of the Above, a podcast from the Eurasia Group Foundation. I want to give a special thanks to our None of the Above team who make all of this possible. Thanks to our producer Caroline Gray and our associate producer and editor Luke Taylor. Music and mixing was done by Zubin Hensler. If you enjoyed what you've heard, subscribe on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or anywhere else you find podcasts. Write and review us, and if there's a topic you want us to cover, send us an email at info@noneoftheabovepodcast.org. Thanks for joining us. Stay safe out there. See you next time.

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