Chris Kolenda on Negotiating with the Taliban

This podcast episode includes references to the Eurasia Group Foundation, now known as the Institute for Global Affairs.

Transcript:

April 27, 2019

CHRIS KOLENDA: How is it that we can have the world's most technologically advanced, most sophisticated military, and yet we can't seem to bring these wars against ragtag militant groups to a successful conclusion after ten, fifteen, to eighteen years?

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MARK HANNAH: My name is Mark Hannah, and I'm the host of None of the Above, a podcast of the Eurasia Group Foundation, where we seek new answers to America's foreign policy questions. This week, I'm speaking with Colonel Chris Kolenda. Chris has a fascinating background. He is the first American to have both fought against the Taliban in combat and then gone back to conduct high level diplomatic talks with the Taliban. Right now, the U.S. is engaged in peace talks with the Taliban. Chris kind of laid the groundwork for that and has a lot of insight for us. Chris, thanks for joining us.

KOLENDA: Thanks. It's a pleasure to be here, Mark. I really appreciate you having me on your podcast.

HANNAH: We are now in the eighteenth year of our military engagement in Afghanistan. You served there more than a decade ago. If somebody had told you then that we would still have troops on the ground in Afghanistan, would you be surprised?

KOLENDA: From a perspective of 2009, we certainly didn't believe we would still be involved in combat in Afghanistan. We would have thought that we would have had a peace process or that we would have been able to reduce the Taliban threat, such that the United States forces would be able to leave the country. But unfortunately, that hasn't been the case.

HANNAH: When you were part of the Obama administration's exploratory talks with the Taliban, what surprised you the most about your negotiating partners?

KOLENDA: I guess the thing that surprises you the most when you first begin any of this and you're talking to your adversary, is oftentimes your adversary comes across as just perfectly reasonable people who are fighting for a different cause than you are.

HANNAH: Can you give us an example of that?

KOLENDA: For some of the insurgents we were fighting up in Kunar, in Nuristan in 2007 and 2008, a lot of that fighting was motivated by things like perceptions of disrespect, civilian casualties, and predatory corruption by government officials. And those kinds of issues are ones you can resolve. The ones who are motivated by ideological reasons or reasons of personal power are much more difficult to deal with, of course. But, for the most part, people are fighting for some pretty practical and pragmatic reasons. And in fact, the reason why the Taliban has amassed the strength they have today is not due to ideology. It's due to some very practical concerns of people who support them both in Afghanistan and internationally.

Interlude featuring archival audio

HANNAH: And what is the main goal of this peace process? Obviously it's in the title piece, but what are the objectives of this process?

KOLENDA: Well, it depends on which actor you're talking about, of course. For the Trump administration, the goal has been fairly singular: get the Taliban to make credible commitments that Afghanistan will not be used again as a terrorist safe haven. That's been their singular focus. They've been very silent to date on the human rights issue, which I think is deeply unfortunate. And I hope the United States begins to address those matters more substantively.

HANNAH: Does the Taliban actually pose a threat to the United States? I mean, it's often said that they never have designs on the American homeland the way al-Qaeda does. Can you help us pass for a minute the difference in the distinction between the Taliban and al-Qaeda?

KOLENDA: This is a very important question. I appreciate you asking that. Al-Qaeda is an international terrorist group, and al-Qaeda wants to conduct spectacular 9/11-style attacks on America and the West as a part of their ideology. That's what they do; they're an international terrorist organization. The Taliban is an insurgent group, a group that's been focused solely on Afghanistan. And in fact, since 2009, the Taliban have been very consistent, saying they reject the use of Afghan territory in ways that threaten other countries. And that's been their code for saying we won't allow terrorists safe haven in Afghanistan anymore.

HANNAH: Alright. We'll give them no quarter.

KOLENDA: The terrorists. That's what they're saying. Now, of course, that's the official—

HANNAH: A big part of the anti-Taliban sentiment is essentially that's what they did. They gave al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden room to maneuver.

KOLENDA: The relationship has always been a bit fraught and a bit complicated. The Taliban will say, “We inherited al-Qaeda.” And in fact, in some ways, that's true. Al-Qaeda was invited into Afghanistan after being thrown out of Sudan, and they were invited in under the Rabbani administration. So that was the sort of warlord administration of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, the one the Taliban overthrew. The Taliban are Deobandi Hanafis. Al-Qaeda, of course, is a Wahhabist organization. It's an international terrorist group. Al-Qaeda have always looked down their nose at the Taliban. You'll see letters from al-Qaeda to its operatives in the early days talking about ways to behave around Afghans because it was clear that there were real frictions. There were letters from Mullah Omar to Osama bin Laden saying, in effect, thanks for your support in the past, but there's really no need for you to come back to Afghanistan. It's been this kind of troubled relationship. The Taliban blame al-Qaeda for the predicament they found themselves in after 2001 and beyond. They recognize, looking back on it, that it was the number one cause of their troubles.

Interlude featuring archival audio

HANNAH: Could this all have been avoided if a better negotiation or a better resolution had happened in the late 1990s when the U.S. and the Taliban were negotiating over the extradition and trial of bin Laden?

KOLENDA: Sure, hindsight is 20/20 as you look back on it. You can find ways that perhaps the United States could have been a bit more flexible, in ways the Taliban could have made good on handing bin Laden over. And I hope it's something both the United States and Taliban can learn from. And then, of course, there are other opportunities that both sides missed. In December of 2001, for instance, the Taliban had actually offered to surrender.

Interlude featuring archival audio

KOLENDA: Any good policy or strategy begins with the recognition of reality, and the realities are this. Since the Second World War, an insurgency that has durable indigenous support in its home country and external support—external sanctuary—has never been decisively defeated. In fact, it tends to do well in negotiations. And so you're in a situation where a decisive victory against the Taliban is highly improbable. In this war, how do we gain an outcome that meets our basic interests? And negotiation is that way. So, I'm cautiously optimistic that the Taliban will follow through on wanting to prevent a terrorist safe haven in Afghanistan.

I'm saddened that the Trump administration has not put human rights on the agenda for talks thus far. There's a way to do that without getting into Afghan politics. On the positive side of the ledger, when you look at many of the Taliban's statements since 2009, you see repeated references to human rights and women's rights and girls’ education and women in the workforce. These are things the Taliban never would have said. On the negative side of the ledger, you see uneven application of those policies. You still have places under Taliban control that are maybe not allowing girls to go to school. So I think the peace process is going to have to address these kinds of matters and help smoke out these areas where local actors—be they Taliban, be they Afghan government, or others—may be playing by rules nobody else signs up for.

HANNAH: What do you say to people who argue that the democracy we promoted in Afghanistan was a kind of social engineering? The constitution that was written in 2004 was famously progressive. A quarter of the seats of parliament would be occupied by women. That's more than we have in the United States Congress. Do you think the cultural change there was too abrupt?

KOLENDA: Well, it is one of those issues in which the Afghans are going to have to decide how they're going to live with one another. I would say by the same token, when you compare what the Taliban are saying in their policy documents to what, for instance, our Saudi allies are saying, the Taliban look pretty progressive.

Now, it's not a very high standard. But nonetheless, what you see is that the Taliban is, in some ways, a learning organization on this issue of human rights, and I think the international community needs to continue to hold their feet to the fire. The second thing is that a peace process is very unlikely to result in a Taliban takeover. Twenty-seven percent of the current Afghan civil service are women, and there are very active civil society organizations in Afghanistan who are all connected to the world. So, any shenanigans from the Taliban along these matters is going to get trumpeted throughout the international community. It's not like pre-2001, where it's all hidden and not reported at all. It's going to be very much reported. So you're going to have the Taliban, which at the end of the day is going to be a significant but not majority player in Afghan politics, dealing with an Afghan society that in many ways has really emerged, particularly the Afghan women. And the Taliban, first of all, are not going to be able to turn back the clock. And second, in many ways, don't appear to want to turn back the clock.

HANNAH: The Afghan government right now is sort of assumed to be in a position to back any agreement that is reached by the U.S. government and its negotiating partners. How stable and strong are the Afghan armed services right now, the Afghan military? Is it able to maintain order and stability after the U.S. goes home?

KOLENDA: The strength of the Afghan government is a very important question on this. And I think it's important to understand how we got into this position. In 2001, the Taliban were among the most reviled entities in the world. I would say they were probably among the top five. When you ask Americans what images come to mind when hearing the word Taliban, first is, of course, the 9/11 attacks and Osama bin Laden. Second is the blowing up of the ancient Buddhist statues in central Afghanistan. And third is the executions, stoning of women, in the Kabul soccer stadium. But as the new Afghan government came in, they're replacing one of the most incompetent and reviled regimes in the world, and all they had to do was govern just a little bit better. And you know what? They wouldn't do it. The Afghan government grew into a predatory and kleptocratic regime that drove people back into the arms of the Taliban. And so the result is where we are now.

HANNAH: Isn't this a pattern, though? I mean, when the Soviet Union invaded in 1979, there was a lack of legitimacy. And then the mujahideen took over with CIA sponsorship, and they were largely seen as illegitimate. And then the Taliban took over, and they were seen as illegitimate. Now the Afghan government that is there has been supported by the international community, including the United States, and they're having a hard time with establishing their legitimacy. Where do you find hope?

KOLENDA: Well, the hope is in the peace process. The only way to deal with some of these chronic problems—like corruption and kleptocracy, the poppy trade, black market—is through a peace process where all of the major Afghan parties agree on a system of governance. They're going to have to sort that out. You can't legislate it from outside. Afghans are going to have to sort out a way to live together. And ultimately, Afghans are the only ones who can decide the political future of Afghanistan.

HANNAH: How long do you see us being there before we can bring our troops home?

KOLENDA: Therein lies the rub. The United States would be making a strategic error in agreeing to a fixed timeline for troop withdrawal with the Taliban.

Interlude featuring archival audio

HANNAH: Ashraf Ghani, the current president, said once that timetables concentrate the mind. Don't you think that if the government is having some difficulty keeping its eyes on the prize, that it also lends some urgency? That's the counterargument.

KOLENDA: Right, and that was the theory the Obama administration had when they wanted all troops out in 2014. All it did was concentrate the kleptocratic behavior to such a high degree that the United States found they couldn't leave because the government probably would have collapsed at that point. So the timetable will create incentives for the Taliban to simply run out the clock and see if they can get a U.S. troop withdrawal for free. A better approach—a more productive approach—would be to tie troop withdrawal to political achievements in the peace process. How long will we be in Afghanistan? It's hard to say. I'm hoping it's based on these political milestones. This is a peace process that is not going to be quick. Afghans have been fighting one another for forty years now. They've been at war for forty years. There's a lot of scar tissue. And so this peace process is going to take a while. I think having some sort of international troop presence that is able to keep all sides honest and prevent a security vacuum seems to me to be an important component to a peace process that has a durable outcome.

HANNAH: Afghanistan is this place where people say empires go to die. It's a difficult place. There are nearly forty tribes, a lot of small villages separated by large mountains. Is this a governable territory and a governable population?

KOLENDA: Well, you know, Afghans have governed themselves for thousands of years. I don't think that's an issue. They certainly don't need outside help. In fact, when outsiders get involved, it creates these kinds of frictions and conflicts. So this is a huge problem, and the Afghan government and Taliban negotiations are one part of this puzzle of peace in Afghanistan. The other part that hasn't been addressed to date, and needs to be addressed, is this international dimension. Regional actors have been amplifying conflict in Afghanistan for the last forty years.

Interlude featuring archival audio

KOLENDA: As a commander in eastern Afghanistan, we were in one of the deadliest places in the country. You get to see the full range of this conflict from that perspective. I know exactly what it feels like to bring the full weight of the American military and 800 cavalry paratroopers to bear on Taliban formations and absolutely crush them time and time again. I know what it feels like to experience the agony of having your soldiers killed and badly wounded in these fights with the Taliban and others. I know what it feels like to sit across the table from people who maybe a week or a month before were trying to kill you, and now you're trying to figure out ways to work together for common objectives. And I know what it feels like to talk with them and to subtly impose your will on an adversary and convince them that you can work together for common objectives. I've seen the impact Afghan women have had on that country, and the impact has been so substantial that they've even gotten the Taliban to talk about the importance of human rights and women's rights because they know this is a huge vulnerability for them. So I've seen the horrors, the agonies, the triumphs, and achievements that go with war.

HANNAH: Let's just say somebody new comes into office in 2020, and you have an ability to brief the incoming commander in chief on what she or he should do with the situation in Afghanistan. What would that be?

KOLENDA: Well, it's to look at what the policy is that gives you the best chance of a favorable and durable outcome, one that protects U.S. interests over the long haul. And that, quite frankly, is to at least try to sustain a peace process and the proper enforcement mechanisms to make it durable. I believe that the policymakers, whether it's this administration or the next one, have a duty and an obligation to advance a peace process that respects the service and sacrifice of Americans and our international partners and Afghans alike. It's a responsibility I think policymakers owe, not only to the American people and its citizens, but to the people they put in harm's way.

HANNAH: It's a tricky thing. You know, how do you ask a person to be the last person to die for a mistake? I'm not suggesting that Afghanistan in general is a mistake, but as this process continues, there were just four Americans who died over Thanksgiving, I think.

KOLENDA: The other thing I'd say is we shouldn't just keep people in harm's way because we don't know what else to do. When you look at Afghanistan, when you look at Iraq, when you look at Syria, when you look at Somalia, Libya—all of these recent conflicts—they don't reflect very well on our policy and strategy-making process and capabilities. I think we owe it to the people we put in harm's way to take a hard look at this and engage in a policy and strategy process far more competently than we have in the past.

HANNAH: I’m Mark Hannah, and this has been None of the Above, a podcast from the Eurasia Group Foundation. If you enjoyed what you heard, we appreciate you subscribing on Google Play, iTunes, and anywhere else you find podcasts. Thanks for joining us.

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