Episode 20: Namaste, Trump
Dhruva Jaishankar and Aparna Pande on US-India Military Ties
On Monday, President Donald Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi inked a new defense deal as violence escalated in response to Modi’s controversial Citizen Amendment Act. Over 3 billion dollars’ worth of American-made helicopters and military equipment will go to the Indian armed forces. What interests are being served by this defense deal, and how will India use this new weaponry? Mark Hannah sits down with two leading experts on US-India relations to unpack American and Indian security interests in the region, including shared concerns about a rising China in the Indo-Pacific. Is India a reliable security partner for the United States? And will we see any blowback in nearby Pakistan, China, or Kashmir, as a result of this deal?
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Dhruva Jaishankar is the director of the US Initiative at the New Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation. He is the author of the 2019 report, “Acting East: India In The Indo-Pacific.”
Aparna Pande is the director of the Hudson Institute’s Initiative on the Future of India and South Asia. Her latest book is titled From Chanakya to Modi: Evolution of India’s Foreign Policy.
This podcast episode includes references to the Eurasia Group Foundation, now known as the Institute for Global Affairs.
Transcript:
February 28, 2020
Interlude featuring archival audio
MARK HANNAH: Welcome to another episode of None of the Above. This is Mark Hannah, your host. We are broadcasting from Eurasia Group Foundation. This week, Donald Trump was in India on his first official visit as president of the United States. He received a boisterous and warm welcome. He appeared in India's, and the world's, largest cricket stadium alongside Prime Minister Narendra Modi for a rally with a crowd larger than a hundred thousand people. He also visited the Taj Mahal with the First Lady, and it was announced that the United States and India will sign a major defense deal. The U.S. will sell over three billion dollars’ worth of American helicopters and other military equipment to New Delhi.
To make sense of all of this, I came down to Washington to chat with two of America's leading experts on U.S.-India relations. We are joined this week by Aparna Pande. Aparna spends her days thinking about the future of India. She does this at the Hudson Institute, where she leads the initiative on the future of India and South Asia. She is the author of From Janaki to Modi: The Evolution of India's Foreign Policy. Also with us in the studio is Dhruva Jaishankar. Dhruva recently moved from Delhi to Washington to lead up a project with the Observer Research Foundation. Dhruva and Aparna, let's get right into it.
Interlude featuring archival audio
APARNA PANDE: There is some level of a struggle between two ideas of India, and that has been right from the time of India's independence. It is just becoming stronger today. There's the idea of the secular India, or the Nehru-Gandhi India at the time of independence, which is reflected in the Indian constitution and which a large number of Indians, including me, grew up in. Then there's the counter-idea of a more conservative Hindutva, nationalism India. And those two ideas have been at a struggle. And when ideas struggle, it is universities and students where you'll find the largest amount of activism, demonstrations, and protests.
PANDE: And that is what you see has been happening in the last seven to ten years in India. The struggle between these two ideas is coming out in economics, in domestic politics, in identity politics, and even in demonstrations and protests.
HANNAH: India is a flashpoint as the world's largest democracy. There is a lot at stake for U.S. interests. Can you talk more about that?
DHRUVA JAISHANKAR: You know, I think there have been four different things driving this U.S.-India relationship, and sometimes some of these elements have been more pronounced than others. One is obviously the strategic logic of the relationship in the Indo-Pacific. As you see China rising much more rapidly than many people anticipated, its behavior and assertiveness now being felt in many parts of the world, the U.S. and India increasingly see each other as an important partnership to balance against that and to hedge against that rise.
I think the growing trade relationship is another element of trade and economic relationship. Over two thousand U.S. companies that now have a presence in India have employees in India. There's two-way investment. The largest number of startups in the U.S.—billion dollar startups by foreign-born people—are by Indians. So, there is a growing economic component. I think two of the elements, in one—I think this is less pertinent for the Trump administration—but for President Obama, it was really important that India was seen as key to finalizing a number of multilateral initiatives, including climate change, which is big, but also internet governance and a number of other things. And finally, I think there is the Indian diaspora as well. A combination of these factors has played a role.
HANNAH: I want to turn back to this defense deal for a moment.
Interlude featuring archival audio
HANNAH: It is sort of a naive question here, but why did the American president and the Indian prime minister ink this defense deal? Obviously, Donald Trump has been hawking American weapons all around the world to Saudi Arabia. What are India's motivations here? And do you think it will be good for both India's national security interests and the American national security interests? I want to start with Dhruva and then move on to Aparna on this one.
JAISHANKAR: India has traditionally been heavily reliant on Russia for defense equipment, basically during the Cold War and into the 1990s. It was almost predominantly Russia providing defense equipment, a little bit from Western Europe, and they had to do for a number of things: the Cold War era and also U.S. sanctions related to India's nuclear program. Over time since 1999—late 1999, early 2000—from the Clinton administration onwards, those sanctions have basically been lifted. And the export controls the U.S. government had put in place for India have slowly been lifted. The Bush administration did a lot of it; the Obama administration went further. And Trump has actually taken that step forward. And this has basically opened the door for the U.S. to sell a lot of military hardware to India.
HANNAH: So what is essentially changed here? What context led to this growing U.S.-India security cooperation we're seeing today?
PANDE: From the American side it is, first, an economic imperative. You have a large market. You always wanted to send equipment, and you want to sell it to as many countries as possible, especially countries you have as partners and allies. So a key bargain—
HANNAH: That's kind of a caricature, that we're just the world's gun dealers and an arms dealer.
PANDE: But look at it this way: in almost every American strategic partner and ally, what is the basis of the relationship? If it is Western Europe and the Atlantic, it is shared values plus economics plus defense. So economics and defense parts become part of it. Selling equipment to allies is a key part of the strategic relationship. Second is India does need military equipment. Most of India's equipment is not just Soviet made, as you have mentioned, but most of it, about sixty percent or so, is old and obsolete. It needs to be upgraded.
HANNAH: One of the big headlines here is when Prime Minister Modi came to the United States, Donald Trump hosted a sort of love fest rally that said, “Howdy, Modi.” It was this warm embrace of the Indian prime minister. And now this week, Prime Minister Modi seems to be reciprocating in kind.
Interlude featuring archival audio
HANNAH: What do you think contributes to, essentially, a bromance happening between the Indian prime minister and the American president?
PANDE: I'd say three reasons, Mark. One is it reflects the deep strategic relationship between India and the United States. This is the sixth U.S. president, but the fourth American president who's gone to the U.S. back to back, if you go back to President Clinton, George W. Bush, President Obama, and now President Trump.
HANNAH: Why do you think it's becoming such a trend? Obviously U.S.-India trade has increased substantially in the past ten, twenty years.
PANDE: Actually, it's more than that. Going back to the end of the Second World War when the US was looking for allies, it first looked at India, even before the modern Indian state was founded in ‘47. A few months before that—and things didn't work out with the Cold War and the way it went. But—for the U.S. establishment—India has always been a partner of choice. And here the China factor comes in, the large Indian middle class and market, and the fact that the U.S. will have a partner, an ally, in the broader India, Asia, Indo-Pacific, Asia-Pacific, and whatever—
HANNAH: Is there more to it than geopolitical interests, though? There seems to be at least in American media narratives a sense that there is a simpatico between Modi and Donald Trump. Both have built their political popularity on a type of nationalism that is rooted in identity politics. And obviously there are ways in which both of them are among European and Western and American observers representing a bit of an illiberal turn. What do you think is contributing to this kind of meeting of the minds?
PANDE: So I'd say three things. One, yes, there's a bromance. There's a very close chemistry between the two leaders. Both are very similar at some levels—nationalist, populist, and when it comes to economic matters, protectionist, which is what leads to problems in trade negotiations, which, considering the strategic imperative of the relationship, should have been easier to do. However, personal chemistry between leaders do make a difference. They make it easier to resolve certain issues on the strategic side, the defense side. On the one hand, it leads to personal chemistry. On the other, it does lead to tensions and creates problems in negotiations.
HANNAH: It seems, some observers might say, “Well, India is getting a lot with this package, but other than cash, what is the U.S. getting?” If it came down to it, would India really have America's back? Donald Trump is always asking this question of countries in Asia, Japan, and notably, we're protecting them. They're not protecting us. But is India a reliable partner for the U.S.? And what can you point to demonstrate that?
PANDE: Yes. And the reason I would say is that it is India's backyard, and it's India's sphere of influence, which India has always been concerned about, irrespective of whether the United States is going to be in the region or not. India's always viewed the Indian Ocean region in the greater Indian Ocean region, right from the Straits of Malacca to the Persian Gulf, as its neighborhood, its neighborhood where it would like to ensure there is no other part which has preeminence and will interfere with Indian dominance. American military equipment helps India boost its capability. But unlike American treaty allies, India does not need a security guard or a security provider. India would like to be the security provider in the region. It does not need any other security provider there. It will take care of the region on its own if need be. It does not necessarily need them. If people ask what they are getting, they're getting a country which actually views the region as its sphere of influence and will provide security in the region.
PANDE: I would say India is stepping up on the counter-terrorism, but India prefers a gradual—for example, India would prefer the capacity building training for the countries so they can do a lot themselves. And India would assist them. India is still reluctant to openly go out and do something, except by and large, India's realism and its use of force has traditionally been limited to the subcontinent. India's sending of troops outside the subcontinent, even if you see Afghanistan or Southeast Asia or the Middle East, it will still be under the U.N. mandate. It's still going to be difficult as of now, and I would say at least for some years, for an Indian government to send troops to the Middle East or to Southeast Asia without it being a U.N. mandate. Within the subcontinent? Yes. From Nepal to Sri Lanka, from Maltese to Bangladesh.
HANNAH: Dhruva, there's a stereotype that India is this soft statement: it's more of a values-driven foreign policy than a clear-eyed, cold, calculating pursuit of security interests. Is this an unfair characterization of Indian foreign policy?
JAISHANKAR: I would disagree with that assessment. And I think it's not just in recent times—I would go back to 1947. India has used force. I think when India was made independent, it was a fractured country. There were 500+ princely states that had to be incorporated. Most of them were done peacefully and diplomatically, but in three cases in Kashmir and Hyderabad, India actually used force in its first. And this is months after its independence to unify the country. It liberated Goa from the Portuguese. It intervened in Bangladesh on humanitarian grounds, and it fought a full-fledged war with Pakistan to create another country, again the justification being the impending genocide there. It intervened in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s. It played gunship diplomacy in the Seychelles in the ‘80s.
So, I think there is a nice myth that many Indians propagate, sometimes a good reason, that India is the moral superpower. But I think the evidence doesn't back that. Even with China, a lot of people remember the 1962 border war, where China defeated India, which was a real humiliation for India. But just a few years later, there were skirmishes, and then in 1967, in the 1980s, there was a major military standoff between India and China. And then again in 2013, 2014, and 2017. The idea that there's been an absence of hard power in India's foreign policy—I'm not sure the historical record bears that out.
HANNAH: And it's also the case that Donald Trump withdrew military sales to Pakistan.
Interlude featuring archival audio
HANNAH: Potentially, I'd imagine that the step down in security cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan is of some interest to the political officials in India, too.
PANDE: It is. If you recall, President Trump actually mentioned Pakistan in his speech. He said that the U.S. is cracking down and asking Pakistan to take action on terror and that the U.S. expects some positive results. He knew India would be interested, and he did mention Pakistan, just as he indirectly alluded to China in one of his phrases when he talked about India's democracy and shared values with India. So he did talk about Pakistan. And Pakistan does matter. The Pakistan-China relationship matters. Pakistan's use of jihadi in India matters—Pakistan-Afghanistan matter.
HANNAH: Staying with the major defense deal that was just struck, are there any kind of reprisals this might trigger, or is there a way in which certain countries in the region might feel provoked? I'm thinking, obviously, about China, Pakistan, and Muslims living in Kashmir, who might feel the brunt of this new weaponry. Where might we see blowback from India's reliance on U.S. military equipment, if at all, Dhruva?
JAISHANKAR: You know, it's hard to say. I don't think the deals that have been done to date, including the ones this week, will significantly tilt the balance in either the India-China equation or the India-Pakistan equation. That's not to say they're not important. That's not to say they're not beneficial. But there were concerns in the ‘80s when the United States was continuing to sell AWACS to Pakistan, and India felt at that time and actually successfully lobbied the Reagan administration that time to not sell them to Pakistan. I don't think at this point we're seeing something of such significance, like ballistic missile defense kind of agreement, something that would really alter the balance.
HANNAH: It's not as if the Islamic world is up in arms when the U.S. sells weapons to India the way it would get up in arms when it sells weapons to Israel?
JAISHANKAR: Or Saudi Arabia or UAE—there's much more at stake there, partly because of those countries and their potential vis-a-vis Iran. So I'm not sure. Again, it's not changing that much. Again, another story that's not being told that you alluded to previously was the drop in U.S. military assistance to Pakistan. And partly because Pakistan's public finances are in such dire straits, they're not able to. India does not have a huge budget for purchases of military hardware. But Pakistan certainly is much more cash-strapped. It has traditionally been much more reliant on assistance from the United States. And that has really dried up, barring some reimbursements related to the war in Afghanistan.
HANNAH: How worrying is it for India and for the U.S., potentially, that China just poured billions of dollars into development projects in Myanmar?
JAISHANKAR: I think it has been Chinese investments even before the Belt and Road Initiative was unveiled in 2013. And India felt that in Sri Lanka, in the Maldives, in East Africa, in Pakistan, very significantly, China-Pakistan economic corridor. We have seen that economic weight of China being translated into political weight and in some cases having security implications, including for India. This has been a long and abiding concern. India has actually boycotted China's Belt and Road Initiative. It does not participate in projects under that label. But India does also have very complex ties with China. China is a major investor in India as well.
HANNAH: We've spent a little bit of time talking about the ways in which American and Indian security interests are aligned. Aparna, where do they diverge? In your research, where do you find the most tension between the U.S. and India?
PANDE: I'll go back to something which I mentioned earlier, which is that while India and the U.S. are strategically aligned, and they agree on the Indo-Pacific, from Delhi's perspective, the eastern side of the Indo-Pacific is more important than the western side. What traditionally comes under CENTCOM, Pakistan all the way to the Middle East is more critical to India's security interests. Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and the Gulf are more critically important than the South China Sea.
Secondly, I would say—
HANNAH: Does Modi want the United States to stay in Afghanistan perpetually?
PANDE: Would like to, yes.
JAISHANKAR: Well, but that's not real easy.
PANDE: It's not realistic. It's not going to happen. But yes, India has concerns about the upcoming—next week—negotiations and deals. India has concerns of the impact that will have not just on Afghanistan, but on India as well and what Pakistan will take away from that deal in negotiation. The second part is that Indo-Pacific is primarily maritime-based. A lot of India's concerns are land-based. The conflict with China for India's land base is not just sea-based.
HANNAH: And America's footprint is very naval in that part of the world.
PANDE: Yes. And Indo-Pacific—that's the other area where India would for the India-China border, where India has had a couple of conflicts, some mentioned by Dhruva—is important. The Pakistan-China border—that is the land-based conflict India is concerned about. And thirdly, while India does see China as a rival and has seen China as a rival, India does not seek enemies. It does not want a confrontation because the confrontation doesn't help India or help China. India doesn't have the economic or military capability or capacity to confront or go to war. So, it would much rather not be pushed into a situation where there is confrontation with China for which India is not ready, or India does not desire it.
HANNAH: Dhruva and Aparna, thank you very much for joining us.
JAISHANKAR: Thank you.
PANDE: Thank you so much.
HANNAH: Be sure to check out Dhruva’s work as the director of the U.S. initiative at the Observer Research Foundation and Aparna’s work as the director of the Hudson Institute's Initiative on the Future of India and South Asia. I am Mark Hannah of the Eurasia Group Foundation, and this has been another episode of None of The Above. We’d appreciate you subscribing anywhere you get podcasts. If there's a topic you want us to cover, shoot us an email at info@egfound.org. Thanks for joining us. Catch you next time.
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